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A RETURN TO FORM FOR  
THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE 
Alex Glashausser* 
Abstract: This Article challenges the prevailing doctrinal, political, and 
academic view that the Exceptions Clause—which provides that “the su-
preme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, 
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make” —gives Congress a license to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdic-
tion. Properly interpreted, the facially ambiguous clause instead allows 
Congress to shift cases within the Court’s jurisdiction from appellate to 
original form. The word “Exceptions,” that is to say, applies not to “Juris-
diction” but rather to “appellate.” In its initial draft, the clause unmistaka-
bly affected only the form, not the existence, of jurisdiction: “[T]his su-
preme jurisdiction shall be appellate only, except in those instances, in 
which the legislature shall make it original . . . .” The Article traces the 
devolution of that clear language into the final nebulous version, explain-
ing at each step of the editing process why the Constitutional Convention 
delegates tinkered with the wording. As a result of what the delegates 
thought were innocuous changes, the legislative exceptions power became 
susceptible to the misconception that it was confiscatory. It was meant in-
stead to be transformative, allowing Congress to empower the Supreme 
Court by shifting important cases from appellate to original form. In short, 
the clause was designed not to eliminate cases, but to expedite them. 
Introduction 
 If James Madison had gotten his way in the summer of 1787, laws 
proposed by Congress would, before enactment, be reviewed by federal 
judges, who could veto them. A “convenient” number of judges, to-
gether with the chief executive, would wield that power as a “council of 
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revision.”1 Though the plan was twice defeated during the early weeks of 
the Federal Convention in Philadelphia,2 Madison kept insisting that 
the inclusion of judges in such a council “would be useful to the Judici-
ary departmt. by giving it an additional opportunity of defending itself 
agst: Legislative encroachments.”3 A “real source of danger,” he warned, 
based on states’ experiences, was the “powerful tendency in the Legisla-
ture to absorb all power into its vortex.”4 
 A leader of the successful opposition was Nathaniel Gorham of 
Massachusetts, chairman of the Convention’s all-inclusive Committee of 
the Whole House5 and former President of the Confederation Con-
gress. Though a “genial”6 and even “lusty”7 fellow, Gorham found several 
faults with Madison’s idea: judges had no special aptitude for policy;8 
judges ought not have any “prepossessions” about laws they apply from 
the bench;9 and a proliferation of judges on the council would dilute 
the veto power of the executive.10 But he expressed no interest in sub-
jecting the judiciary to legislative control.11 “All agree,” stressed Gor-
                                                                                                                      
1 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 15 (May 29), 21 (Virginia 
plan) (Madison’s notes) (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter Records]. In each citation 
of Farrand’s Records, to orient the reader, I have included the page number for the start of 
the day in question followed by the page number for the specifically relevant material, 
along with a parenthetical indication of the source. The most common sources are the 
official but somewhat sparse journal kept by the Convention’s secretary, William Jackson, 
and the thorough notes of James Madison. When applicable, I have cited multiple sources 
within Records. 
2 See 1 id. at 93 ( June 4), 94 ( journal) (recording postponement of the original pro-
posal in favor of resolution excluding judiciary from council), 98 (Madison’s notes); id. at 
130 ( June 6), 131 ( journal) (recording the rejection of a motion to reinstate a role for 
judges in the council), 137–40 (Madison’s notes). 
3 2 id. at 71 ( July 21), 74 (Madison’s notes). 
4 Id. 
5 See 1 id. at 29 (May 30), 29 ( journal) (documenting the election of Gorham), 33 
(Madison’s notes). 
6 David O. Stewart, The Summer of 1787: The Men Who Invented the Constitu-
tion 54 (2007). 
7 3 Records, supra note 1, at 87 (according to a character sketch by Georgia’s William 
Pierce), 88. 
8 2 id. at 71 ( July 21), 73 (Madison’s notes). 
9 2 id. at 71 ( July 21), 79 (Madison’s notes). 
10 Id. 
11 Other opponents of Madison’s idea voiced concerns similar to Gorham’s; none of 
them advocated legislative control of the judiciary. Gorham’s colleague from Massachu-
setts, Elbridge Gerry, assailed Madison’s plan throughout the summer, protesting that it 
would improperly “blend” the judiciary and the executive. E.g., 2 id. at 71 ( July 21), 74–75, 
78 (Madison’s notes). That point was echoed by other opponents, such as fellow Bay Stater 
Caleb Strong, who agreed that “the power of making ought to be kept distinct from that of 
expounding, the laws.” 2 id. at 71 ( July 21), 75 (Madison’s notes). The interest of Madi-
son’s opponents was thus in keeping the branches separate, rather than making one sub-
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ham, finding common ground, “that a check on the Legislature is nec-
essary.”12 Still, he dismissed any need for the proposed judicial weapon: 
“The Judges in England have no such additional provision for their de-
fence, yet their jurisdiction is not invaded.”13 
 Today’s prevailing conception of federal legislative power allows for 
such invasion. Most observers interpret the Exceptions Clause in Article 
III of the Constitution as giving Congress nearly free rein to eliminate 
the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court.14 That position 
may not be wholly inconsistent with the somewhat ambiguous text: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme 
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases be-
fore mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Juris-
diction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.15 
Read in context, however, the Exceptions Clause more strongly suggests 
that Congress may transform the Court’s jurisdiction from appellate to 
original. The drafting history of the clause, which originated within a 
week of Madison’s and Gorham’s comments above, confirms that the 
function of the exceptions power was to allow Congress to expedite 
cases to the Court. Never did the delegates to the Convention conceive 
of the clause as a license for Congress to do what Madison feared and 
even Gorham would not countenance: encroach on the Court by invad-
ing its jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                                      
servient to another. None of them disagreed with Gerry’s assessment that judges’ routine 
exposition of the laws in the course of their judicial function would be “a sufficient check 
agst. encroachments on their own department.” 1 id. at 93 ( June 4), 97–98 (Madison’s 
notes); see also 1 id. at 93 ( June 4), 100–01 (Madison’s notes) (noting a comment by Gun-
ning Bedford of Delaware that the veto power was unnecessary because constitutionally 
circumscribing the legislature’s power “would give all the requisite security to the rights of 
the other departments”). 
12 2 id. at 71 ( July 21), 79 (Madison’s notes); see also Ralph A. Rossum, The Courts and 
the Judicial Power, in The Framing and Ratification of the Constitution 222, 227 
(Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987) (asserting that the Constitution’s draft-
ers “knew that in any republican government the greatest threat of tyranny came from the 
legislative branch”). 
13 2 Records, supra note 1, at 71 ( July 21), 73 (Madison’s notes). 
14 See infra notes 48–69 and accompanying text. 
15 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The phrase “other Cases before mentioned” refers to the 
Extension Clause, which lists nine types of “Cases” and “Controversies” to which “[t]he 
judicial Power shall extend.” Id. 
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 In Part I, this Article briefly surveys congressional, judicial, and 
academic perspectives on the extent of such invasive legislative power.16 
Part II analyzes the text of the Exceptions Clause, demonstrating that 
although it may be susceptible to two interpretations, the more natural 
reading protects the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction from encroach-
ment.17 Part III chronicles the drafting and editing of the clause, show-
ing that the delegates to the Federal Convention intended and under-
stood its function as permitting Congress to send cases straight to the 
Court.18 Loose ends of the clause are examined in Part IV; though the 
references to “Regulations” and “Law and Fact” add minor wrinkles to 
congressional authority, they do not undermine the substantive inviola-
bility of the Court’s jurisdiction.19 The Article concludes that regardless 
of one’s approach to constitutional interpretation, the case is strong for 
a return of the Exceptions Clause to its role of allowing exceptions not 
to the Court’s jurisdiction per se, but rather to its appellate form.20 
I. The (Almost) Uniform Understanding of an Invasive Power 
A. Legislative Assumption of Authority 
 If Congress did not purport to have the authority to withhold or 
withdraw cases from the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the 
interpretive issue raised in this Article would be purely academic. 
But federal legislators have repeatedly asserted that authority, 
whether as a way to combat perceived judicial activism21 or in back-
door attempts to amend the Constitution.22 In recent years alone,23 
bills have been introduced seeking to prevent the Supreme Court 
from hearing cases about topics such as school prayer,24 public dis-
plays of the Ten Commandments,25 the Pledge of Allegiance,26 abor-
                                                                                                                      
16 See infra notes 21–94 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 100–244 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 245–305 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 306–323 and accompanying text. 
21 Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts—
Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 Geo. L.J. 2445, 2448–49 (1998). 
22 E.g., Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate over Congress’ Power to Restrict the Ju-
risdiction of the Federal Courts Is Unending, 72 Geo. L.J. 1311, 1326 (1984). 
23 For a comprehensive review of jurisdiction-stripping bills through the years, see 
Helen Norton, Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge to Judicial Review, 41 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1003, 1007–10 (2006). 
24 Public Prayer Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 2104, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007). 
25 Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005). 
26 Pledge Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 699, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007). 
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tion,27 and same-sex marriage.28 Earlier-targeted topics included ra-
cial integration of schools29 and legislative reapportionment.30 Even 
though such bills rarely become law, they have been more popular 
of late,31 and they can have a chilling effect on the judiciary.32 
 The language in (if not the nomenclature of) those bills is 
straightforward, revealing no compunction about invading the judici-
ary. For example, the Marriage Protection Act of 2009 sought to pro-
vide that “the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction . . . to 
hear or decide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the 
validity under the Constitution of, [the Defense of Marriage Act].”33 
Evidently, a premise of the politicians who try to safeguard legislation 
from judicial review is that Congress may strip the Court of jurisdiction. 
The constitutional source of that putative power has not been legisla-
tively articulated. One way or another, however, from the time that the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred less jurisdiction than prescribed by Ar-
ticle III and thus implicitly excepted certain cases,34 Congress has as-
sumed the power. 
                                                                                                                      
27 Sanctity of Life Act of 2005, H.R. 776, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005). 
28 Marriage Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 1269, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009). 
29 H.R. 1228, 85th Cong. (1957). The modern era of such bills may have been touched 
off by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), after which a Representative from 
South Carolina introduced one providing that no federal jurisdiction “shall extend to . . . 
any action . . . where is drawn in question the validity of a State [law] relating in any man-
ner to the . . . operation of the public schools . . . , on the ground of its being repugnant to 
the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States . . . .” H.R. 1228. 
30 H.R. 11,926, 88th Cong. (1964). After the judicial door to legislative reapportion-
ment opened in the wake of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), a bill (known as the “Tuck 
bill”) was passed by the House of Representatives providing that neither the Supreme 
Court nor any inferior federal court would have jurisdiction to apportion or reapportion 
the legislative districts of any state. See H.R. 11,926. 
31 See Norton, supra note 23, at 1004 (noting an “unprecedented” level of support for 
recent jurisdiction-stripping bills). 
32 See Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of 
America, 1815–1848, at 355 (2007) (detailing how an 1831 bill to repeal Supreme Court 
jurisdiction over appeals from state courts “seems to have intimidated” the Supreme Court 
into sidestepping the politically volatile issue of forced removal of Cherokees from Georgia). 
33 H.R. 1269, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009); see also Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2006) (shielding states from having to recognize acts of other states treating 
same-sex relationships as marriages). 
34 For example, Congress withheld the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over 
state court decisions in which a federal claim had been upheld rather than denied. Judici-
ary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87. 
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B. Judicial Submission 
 Projecting power can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, and sure 
enough, Congress’s superiority has been largely accepted by the Su-
preme Court. Jerome Levy exaggerated only slightly when writing a 
generation ago that “the governmental body most ready to assert the 
power of Congress to deprive the Court of its appellate jurisdiction has 
been the Court itself.”35 
 The Court recently missed the chance to repudiate that power in 
connection with a restrictive bill that in fact became law, the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005.36 Though the statute arguably differed from the 
bills referred to above in that it withdrew only a particular remedy, it 
was phrased in jurisdictional terms: 
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or 
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or 
on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has 
been determined by the United States to have been properly 
detained as an enemy combatant . . . .37 
In Boumediene v. Bush, a 2008 decision, the Court struck down the statute 
as a violation of Article I’s Suspension Clause (protecting the writ of ha-
beas corpus) and thus did not have to consider whether it was otherwise 
constitutional.38 Two years earlier, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a majority of 
the Court had expressly ducked the question of “Congress’ authority to 
impinge upon [its] appellate jurisdiction” on the ground that the rele-
vant provision did not apply to cases pending when it was enacted.39 
 Dissenting in Hamdan, however, Justice Antonin Scalia addressed 
and discounted that concern: 
                                                                                                                      
35 Jerome T. Levy, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: A 
Reappraisal, 22 N.Y.U. Intramural L. Rev. 178, 183 (1967); see also Robert N. Clinton, A 
Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures from the 
Constitutional Plan, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1515, 1561 (1986) (“Ironically, the federal judiciary 
itself created the jurisdictional insecurity that continues to plague it.”). 
36 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006). 
37 Id. 
38 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008). But see Martin J. Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene, and 
Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 25 Const. Comment. 377, 
395 (2009) (arguing that the Boumediene majority implicitly decided that in constitutional 
cases, Congress may not preclude all federal jurisdiction); cf. James E. Pfander, One Su-
preme Court: Supremacy, Inferiority, and the Judicial Power of the United States 
161–62 (2009) (suggesting that the Court’s nondogmatic analysis in Boumediene “would 
presumably inform the Court’s evaluation of [other] jurisdiction-stripping legislation”). 
39 548 U.S. 557, 575–76 (2006). 
2010] A Return to Form for the Exceptions Clause 1389 
It is not clear how there could be any such lurking questions, 
in light of the aptly named “Exceptions Clause” of Article III, 
§ 2, which, in making our appellate jurisdiction subject to 
“such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Con-
gress shall make,” explicitly permits exactly what Congress has 
done here.40 
 Justice Scalia’s view is representative of that evinced by the Supreme 
Court over its history. The Court has not yet confronted this issue di-
rectly.41 A Reconstruction-era statement in Ex parte McCardle was its 
clearest acknowledgment of legislative authority to withdraw its appel-
late jurisdiction,42 but even that statement was arguably dictum.43 Still, 
the justices have repeatedly made comments to the effect that the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction is at the mercy of Congress.44 Those com-
ments have not always been as clear as Justice Scalia’s in identifying the 
                                                                                                                      
40 Id. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
41 See Norton, supra note 23, at 1012 (noting that the Court “has yet to provide any de-
finitive guidance on this controversy”). 
42 See 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869). Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice 
Salmon Chase interpreted the Exceptions Clause deferentially: “We are not at liberty to 
inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the 
Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court 
is given by express words.” Id. (dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground 
that Congress had, during pendency of the appeal, repealed the jurisdictional statutory 
provision relied on by a habeas corpus petitioner). 
43 See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 
229, 246–48 (1973) (criticizing the Court for disingenuously claiming a lack of jurisdiction 
when an alternative to the provision cited by petitioner was available and known to the 
justices). 
44 E.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 661 (1996) (“[O]ur appellate powers . . . ‘are 
limited [by Congress].’” (quoting Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 
314 (1810))); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 567 (1962) (noting with approval that 
“Congress has consistently with [Article III] withdrawn the jurisdiction of this Court to 
proceed with a case then sub judice . . .”); Daniels v. R.R. Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250, 254 
(1866) (“In order to create [appellate] jurisdiction in any case, . . . an act of Congress must 
supply the requisite authority.”); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119 (1847) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court possesses no appellate power in any case, unless conferred upon it 
by act of Congress . . . .”); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799) (“If 
congress has given the power to this Court, we possess it, not otherwise . . . .”). But cf. 
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575 (referring to, though not answering, “grave questions about Con-
gress’ authority to impinge upon this Court’s appellate jurisdiction”); Glidden Co., 370 U.S. 
at 605 n.11 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (raising doubt about whether Ex parte McCardle “could 
command a majority view today”). 
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Exceptions Clause as the source of the purported legislative power,45 but 
that is the usual apparent assumption.46 
 Even if at some point the Court were to resist congressional en-
croachment on its appellate jurisdiction, it seems unlikely to decide 
that the Exceptions Clause permits Congress instead to expand its 
original jurisdiction. Though Justice John Marshall wrote little about 
the Exceptions Clause directly in Marbury v. Madison, his opinion, by 
holding that Congress could not add to the constitutionally designated 
original jurisdiction, doctrinally foreclosed that interpretation.47 Given 
the iconic status of that case, it is no surprise that the Court has per-
petuated the conventional view of the clause. 
C. Academic Rationalization (and Its Discontents) 
 The legislative and judicial perspective on the vulnerability of the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction is shared by most scholars; the 
orthodox view is that Congress has more or less free rein to stop cases 
from ever reaching the Court.48 William Van Alstyne, for example, has 
called the power to make exceptions “as plenary as the power to regu-
                                                                                                                      
45 See, e.g., Barry, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 119 (citing as authority only “the constitution of 
the United States”). 
46 See, e.g., Felker, 518 U.S. at 661 (citing the Exceptions Clause in conjunction with a 
statement about legislative limits on appellate jurisdiction). 
47 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174–75 (1803). 
48 See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opin-
ionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 895, 908 (1984) (finding “compelling” 
reasons to conclude that “there are no substantial internal limits on Congress’ article III 
power to limit the Court’s appellate jurisdiction”); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to 
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 206 
(1997) (“The textual reading . . . according to which Article III grants Congress broad 
power over the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction . . . has come to be referred to as 
the orthodox, or traditional, interpretation.”); Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 
108 Colum. L. Rev. 1883, 1894 (2008) (“Under the traditional view, . . . Congress has con-
siderable—if not unlimited—power to deprive the lower federal courts of jurisdiction and 
to strip the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction.”); Julian Velasco, Congressional Control 
over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View, 46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 671, 763 
(1997) (defending “the orthodox position” that Congress has “nearly plenary authority to 
regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts”); see also William R. Casto, An Orthodox View 
of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 Const. Comment. 
89, 94 (1990) (defending the theory of “plenary power”); Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the 
Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the 
Exceptions Clause, 24 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 385, 423 (1983) (calling congressional power 
over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction “plenary” and dismissing contrary arguments); 
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1005 (1965) 
(defending the position that “Congress has the power . . . to strike at what it deems judicial 
excess by delimitations of the jurisdiction . . . of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion” and finding “no basis” for limits on that power within Article III). 
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late commerce.”49 That view is based primarily on the Exceptions 
Clause. To some, that clause is the direct source of the putative legisla-
tive power; to others, it is the basis for locating the power in the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause. Either way, the conventional argument is that 
exceptions enable Congress to withdraw jurisdiction from the Court.50 
 Adherents of that view also advance another series of arguments. 
Although they generally accept that Section 1 of Article III vests the 
“judicial Power” in the Supreme Court, they have a hard time reconcil-
ing jurisdiction-stripping with the opening of Section 2: “The judicial 
Power shall extend to [nine categories of cases and controversies].”51 
Theoretically, even if the Extension Clause is a straightforward grant of 
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, the Exceptions Clause later in the 
same section could be read to undercut that grant—that is, after all, 
something exceptions do.52 But most conventionalists sense that such a 
                                                                                                                      
49 Van Alstyne, supra note 43, at 268 (noting that both powers are subject to external 
limitations, such as the Bill of Rights). 
50 See Reynolds Robertson & Francis R. Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court of the United States 1 (1936) (citing the Exceptions Clause as the source of 
power to “delimit[]” the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction); Charles L. Black, Jr., The 
Presidency and Congress, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 841, 842, 845 (1975) (opining that “Con-
gress may make any exceptions it regards as wise to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court” 
and finding “no ground at all” for limitations on that principle); Joseph Blocher, Amending 
the Exceptions Clause, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 971, 1003 (2008) (“The Exceptions Clause is the 
broadest grant of congressional power in the original Constitution not found in Article I, 
and it gives Congress wide authority to alter and abolish federal court jurisdiction.” (foot-
note omitted)); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 
105 Harv. L. Rev. 603, 608–09, 612–13 (1992) (referring to the “venerable principle” that 
the Exceptions Clause grants Congress’s “substantial control” over the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction); Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Juris-
diction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 900, 
901 (1982) (explaining the “common sense interpretation” of the Exceptions Clause as 
offering “fairly broad authority to curb Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction”); Charles E. 
Rice, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Constitutional Basis for the Proposals in Congress 
Today, 65 Judicature 190, 195–96 (1981) (refuting arguments against limitations on con-
gressional power under Exceptions Clause). 
51 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
52 See Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 
138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1633, 1635–36 (1990) (arguing that regardless of the meaning of other 
provisions of Article III, the Exceptions Clause unambiguously empowers the legislature to 
restrict jurisdiction); Velasco, supra note 48, at 712 n.196 (arguing as a backup that 
“[r]egardless of whether the judicial power and jurisdiction refer to two different concepts or 
are synonymous, the Exceptions Clause is not limited by, but rather controls, the words ‘shall 
extend’”). But cf. 1 William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the 
History of the United States 616 (1953) (criticizing the view that the exceptions power 
can be read as “unconditioned by the earlier absolute provisions of Article III”). 
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constitutional collision would be awkward,53 so they try to neutralize 
the Extension Clause on at least one of the following grounds: that the 
“judicial Power” is more inchoate than actual jurisdiction;54 that “shall” 
is not mandatory;55 or that “extend[ing]” power is less definite than 
conferring it.56 Though beyond the scope of this Article, those argu-
ments are unpersuasive. In any event, no scholar defending the re-
ceived wisdom relies solely on the Extension Clause; fundamentally, the 
debate about legislative control of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction 
centers on the Exceptions Clause.57 
                                                                                                                      
53 Though only a partial defender of the orthodoxy, Akhil Amar is one who has called 
such a reading “awkward.” Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A 
Reply, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1651, 1654 (1990) [hereinafter Amar, Reports]; see also Akhil Reed 
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. 
L. Rev. 205, 241 n.120 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, Two Tiers] (opining that such a reading 
“should not be lightly indulged if an alternative reading is possible”); cf. Steven G. 
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1163 (1992) (observing that supporters of mandatory jurisdiction 
maintain that for the commonly assumed congressional power to be supported by text, 
either the Vesting Clause or the Extension Clause would need to have a hole). 
54 E.g., James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and 
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 696, 708, 751–52 
(1998) (noting “confidently” the drafters’ distinction between the terms and concluding 
that “the ‘Judicial Power shall extend to’ language could not mean ‘jurisdiction shall be’”); 
Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1569, 1573–74 
n.14 (1990) (citing with approval a comment from a representative in the First Congress 
that “the failure to give the federal courts jurisdiction does not divest them of the judicial 
power”); Velasco, supra note 48, at 705 n.167 (“At most, the judicial power automatically 
extends to all such cases. Jurisdiction does not.”). 
55 E.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of 
Judicial Power 37–38 (2d ed. 1990) (casting doubt on whether “shall” implies a mandate 
as opposed to the future tense); Harrison, supra note 48, at 212, 217 (deriding the notion 
that the Extension Clause’s “shall” means “must” and paraphrasing the clause as “[t]he 
judicial power may be used to decide . . .”); Velasco, supra note 48, at 702–04 (“[T]he 
words ‘shall extend’ are more permissive than mandatory . . . .”); cf. Meltzer, supra note 54, 
at 1573 n.14 (suggesting that even if “shall” is mandatory, the mandate is only that when 
the judicial power is exercised, “the exercise must be by article III courts”). 
56 E.g., Harrison, supra note 48, at 212 (defending the traditional view based on a para-
phrasing of the Extension Clause as “[t]he judicial power may be used to decide . . .”); 
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 54, at 721–23, 753 (arguing that the editing of the clause 
about cases and controversies from “shall be” to “shall extend” changed the clause from a 
jurisdictional floor to a ceiling); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 
Harv. L. Rev. 1867, 1896 (2005) (“The verb ‘to extend’ suggests today just what it signified 
in 1789: stretching, enlarging. . . . Thus, the scope of the judicial power . . . is not entirely 
fixed by the Constitution but may be stretched or enlarged by acts of Congress.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Velasco, supra note 48, at 703–04 (citing the dictionary definition of “extend” to 
support the claim that Congress’s right to control jurisdiction stems from a “natural read-
ing of the text of the Constitution”). 
57 Gunther, supra note 48, at 899–900 (advocating wide congressional power over ap-
pellate jurisdiction and stating that “[t]he congressional authority to make ‘Exceptions’ 
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 Not all scholars agree on the meaning of the Exceptions Clause. To 
take stock of the range of academic analysis, it is useful to consider the 
clause in context. The first paragraph of Article III vests the judicial 
power in a certain (“supreme”) Court (as well as, potentially, in inferior 
courts); the second extends that power to certain cases. The third unites 
those objects, describing the way the Court interacts with the cases: 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme 
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases be-
fore mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Juris-
diction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.58 
The textual puzzle may be stated simply: what word is subject to “Ex-
ceptions”? 
1. The Orthodox View 
 The conventional answer is “Jurisdiction,”59 in that the exercise of 
the exceptions power takes it away.60 In fact, many conventional schol-
ars do not see a puzzle at all. To them, the congressional prerogative 
to withdraw appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court (without 
shifting it to original form) stems from what they call the “plain,”61  
                                                                                                                      
provides the central textual foundation” for that view); see also Meltzer, supra note 54, at 
1610 (noting that the orthodox view “must assign great weight to the exceptions clause, 
which was rather inconspicuous in the constitutional debate, at least in the Convention 
itself”). 
58 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
59 In a sense, the conventional answer could be the word “all,” in that only some cases 
end up with appellate jurisdiction, but that noncommittal answer ducks the question of 
whether the other cases then have original jurisdiction or none at all. 
60 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 50, at 901 (“A common sense interpretation of the con-
stitutional language would seem to lead to the conclusion that Congress possesses fairly 
broad authority to curb Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.”); Charles E. Rice, Congress 
and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 959, 963–64 (1982) (opining that the 
Exceptions Clause gives Congress a “broad check” on the Supreme Court’s power); 
Wechsler, supra note 48, at 1004–05 (defending broad congressional power under the Ex-
ceptions Clause to eliminate the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction). 
61 John Eidsmoe, The Article III Exceptions Clause: Any Exceptions to the Power of Congress to 
Make Exceptions?, 19 Regent U. L. Rev. 95, 145 (2006); see also Oversight Hearings to Define 
the Scope of the Senate’s Authority Under Article III of the Constitution to Regulate the Jurisdiction of 
the Federal Courts Before the Subcomm. on Constitution of the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 97th Cong. 
51 (1981) (written statement of Paul M. Bator) (stating that the Exceptions Clause “plainly 
indicates that if Congress wishes to exclude a certain category of federal . . . litigation from 
the appellate jurisdiction, it has the authority to do so”). 
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“clear,”62 “unambiguous”63 language of the Exceptions Clause. The mys-
tery they explore is what, if any, constraints encumber the legislative 
power.64 
 A modest strain of the conventional perspective holds that because 
the term “Exceptions” conveys an inherent limit, the exceptions may 
not swallow the appellate jurisdiction whole.65 Perhaps the most com-
monly accepted limit is that Congress may not use the exceptions 
power to deny litigants a federal forum for constitutional claims.66 That 
view is a modern gloss on what Henry Hart tentatively advanced as an 
admittedly indeterminate theory: “[T]he exceptions must not be such 
as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitu-
tional plan.”67 Leonard Ratner put some meat on the bones of that 
                                                                                                                      
62 Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Ju-
risdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 143, 149 (1982); Rice, supra note 
60, at 975; Rossum, supra note 48, at 423; The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Leading Cases, 110 
Harv. L. Rev. 277, 283 (1996) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. 
63 Rice, supra note 60, at 975; Leading Cases, supra note 62, at 283; see also Redish, supra 
note 52, at 1637 (“[T]he inescapable implication of the text is that Congress possesses 
broad power to curb the jurisdiction of . . . the Supreme Court.”). 
64 Many scholars acknowledge limits on Congress’s power imposed by other constitu-
tional provisions, albeit not the other provisions of Article III. E.g., Gunther, supra note 48, 
at 908 (“[T]here are no substantial internal limits on Congress’ article III power to limit 
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.”); Redish, supra note 50, at 902–03, 918–23 (conceding 
the possibility that other constitutional provisions, such as the Due Process Clause, might 
in some circumstances restrain congressional power). 
65 E.g., Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 170–71 (1960) (“[A]n exception cannot destroy the essential 
characteristics of the subject to which it applies.”); Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional 
Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. 
Rev. 17, 44 (1981) (describing the permissible level of legislative interference as “a nibble, 
not a bite”); Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights out of 
the Federal Courts, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 129, 135 (1981) (arguing that the text of the 
Exceptions Clause bars the “total abolition” of jurisdiction). 
66 E.g., Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for 
Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 Va. L. Rev. 
819, 821–22 (1983); Sager, supra note 65, at 67; see also Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Con-
gress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Su-
preme Court, 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 773, 793–95, 806–07 (1982) (tentatively embracing 
the theory but stressing its speculative nature); Tribe, supra note 65, at 140–41 (arguing 
that legislative attempts to “manipulat[e] jurisdiction” to defeat enforcement of constitu-
tional rights are generally impermissible). But cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to 
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1401 
(1953) (calling state courts “the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many 
cases . . . the ultimate ones”); Rice, supra note 50, at 195 (calling the purported limitation 
on congressional power “specious”). 
67 Hart, supra note 66, at 1365; see also Casto, supra note 48, at 96 (defending the inde-
terminacy of Hart’s theory as producing “vague but nevertheless real limits” on Congress). 
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theory, positing that the Court’s “essential functions” that could not be 
abrogated by Congress were to resolve “inconsistent or conflicting in-
terpretations of federal law” by other courts and to maintain the su-
premacy of federal law in the face of conflicts with states.68 Citing five 
eighteenth-century dictionaries, he argued that as a definitional matter, 
an “exception” could not “destroy the essential characteristics of the 
subject to which it applies.”69 
2. Alternative Views 
 A view popular at one time held that exceptions apply only to the 
word “Fact,” such that the sole role of the Exceptions Clause is to let 
Congress protect the right to a jury trial by barring the Supreme Court 
from reviewing facts found by juries.70 A less common view is that the 
reference to “Exceptions” is simply a redundant reminder that the cases 
with original jurisdiction are excepted from the scope of appellate ju-
risdiction by the word “other.”71 Of particular note outside the ortho-
                                                                                                                      
Martin Redish has called the theory “wishful thinking.” Redish, supra note 55, at 28; Re-
dish, supra note 50, at 911. 
68 Ratner, supra note 65, at 161, 202; Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Ju-
dicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 929, 935 
(1982); see also Morris D. Forkosch, The Exceptions and Regulations Clause of Article III and a 
Person’s Constitutional Rights: Can the Latter Be Limited by Congressional Power Under the Former?, 
72 W. Va. L. Rev. 238, 257 (1970) (arguing that Congress has a broad exceptions power 
but may not eliminate “irreducible minimums” that protect individual rights); William S. 
Dodge, Note, Congressional Control of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the Original 
Jurisdiction Clause Suggests an “Essential Role,” 100 Yale L.J. 1013, 1014 (1991) (arguing that 
Congress may not use the Exceptions Clause to “destroy the essential role of the Supreme 
Court as the most important court in the nation”); cf. Pfander, supra note 38, at xiv, 34, 
164 (asserting that Congress cannot eliminate the Supreme Court’s “supervisory” role with 
respect to inferior courts). But cf. Gunther, supra note 48, at 908 (criticizing the “essential 
functions” view as “confusing what Congress ought not to do with what it cannot do”). 
69 Ratner, supra note 68, at 939. 
70 See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court 285–96 (1969); Irving 
Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 Or. L. Rev. 3, 5 
(1973); Henry J. Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 
Minn. L. Rev. 53, 68 (1962); Ira Mickenberg, Abusing the Exceptions and Regulations Clause: 
Legislative Attempts to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 497, 
515 (1983); cf. Mark Strasser, Taking Exception to Traditional Exceptions Clause Jurisprudence: 
On Congress’s Power to Limit the Court’s Jurisdiction, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 125, 125–26, 186–87 
(arguing that the clause “is best understood as intended to protect jury findings and pre-
vent the Court from becoming overburdened with work”). 
71 See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for 
the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 780 (1984) (not necessarily 
embracing this interpretation but stating its plausibility based on the comma after “Excep-
tions”); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdic-
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doxy are the theory of mandatory federal jurisdiction and the interpre-
tation advanced here—that exceptions convert the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction into original form. 
a. The Theory of Mandatory Federal Jurisdiction 
 Currently, the most prominent unconventional view is that of 
mandatory federal jurisdiction. Proponents of that interpretation in 
essence tie “Exceptions” to the word “supreme” (potentially in combi-
nation with “appellate”), arguing that each case or controversy within 
the Extension Clause must be permitted to be adjudicated by a federal 
court (originally or on appeal from a state court), but not necessarily 
the Supreme Court.72 Thus, like the conventional view, the mandatory 
jurisdiction theory recognizes Congress’s power to divest the Supreme 
Court of jurisdiction; the twist is that the power can be wielded only if 
Congress has created inferior courts and shifts the jurisdiction there.73 
 Akhil Amar’s bifurcated theory of federal jurisdiction adopts that 
reading in part.74 In Amar’s view, jurisdiction over what the Extension 
Clause describes as “all Cases” must attach to some Article III court. As 
a result, he argues, with respect to those three categories of disputes, 
the Exceptions Clause simply facilitates the transfer of the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction to inferior federal courts, whose decisions 
                                                                                                                      
tion, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 33 n.177 (1990) (describing this reading as “problematic, but . . . 
not necessarily incorrect”). 
72 See, e.g., 1 Crosskey, supra note 52, at 610–18 (arguing that jurisdiction over all Ar-
ticle III cases must be extended to an Article III court); Julius Goebel, Jr., History of 
the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, at 
247 (1971) (suggesting that the only discretion left with Congress is “to arrange how the 
jurisdiction conferred by [the Extension Clause is] to be disposed”); Clinton, supra note 
71, at 749–50 (excluding “trivial” cases); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power 
Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. Rev. 75, 155 [hereinafter Engdahl, Intrinsic Lim-
its] (arguing that the Exceptions Clause expands legislative discretion under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause to control judicial power by limiting certain cases to certain federal 
courts); David E. Engdahl, What’s in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple “Supreme” 
Courts, 66 Ind. L.J. 457, 488 n.159 (1991) [hereinafter Engdahl, What’s in a Name?] (inter-
preting “Exceptions” as attaching to the word “supreme”). 
73 See Clinton, supra note 71, at 753, 793 (suggesting that the exceptions power was “de-
signed to facilitate the creation of inferior federal courts”); Engdahl, What’s in a Name?, 
supra note 72, at 489 (“Inserting the ‘exceptions’ clause made it permissible for the legisla-
ture to repose less than the full scope of the ‘judicial power’ in the one so-called ‘supreme’ 
court, provided the legislature exercised its option to create other courts as well.”); cf. Har-
rison, supra note 48, at 217 (critiquing the theory on that ground). 
74 Akhil Reed Amar, Taking Article III Seriously: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 85 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 442, 445 (1991) (interpreting the Exceptions Clause as permitting restrictions of “only 
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, not the judicial power of the United States 
as a whole”). 
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need not be subject to review.75 Though again this interpretation de-
pends on the existence of inferior courts, it is, to Amar, a “natural read-
ing of the Exceptions Clause.”76 As for what the Extension Clause de-
scribes not as “all Cases” but rather as “Controversies,” Amar interprets 
the lack of “all” to signal a lack of mandatory federal jurisdiction. Re-
garding those six “permissive” categories, his reading merges with the 
orthodoxy, positing that exceptions can take jurisdiction away from the 
federal court system altogether.77 
b. The Transformative Interpretation 
 In theory, all sorts of readings of the Exceptions Clause may be 
conceivable; for example, exceptions could be tied to the word “Court,” 
such that Congress could allow appellate jurisdiction to be exercised 
instead by the supreme legislative body.78 But context and common 
sense quickly narrow the field. The most plausible—though not air-
tight—interpretation of the text tethers the exceptions to the word 
“appellate.” And the drafting history confirms that while Congress may 
well be able to restrict review of facts, the primary function of “Excep-
tions,” as understood by the delegates to the Federal Convention, was 
to allow Congress to transform jurisdiction from appellate to original. 
 That conception of the Exceptions Clause has not been wholly 
dormant since 1787. But for the most part, it has been tentatively pro-
posed in passing, by way of brainstorming.79 Over the past several years, 
however, some scholars have begun to take the idea more seriously. 
                                                                                                                      
75 Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 53, at 255–57. 
76 Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 467 (1989). 
77 Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 53, at 255. 
78 That terminology is not as fanciful as it might sound; the delegates to the Federal 
Convention characterized the Virginia plan as calling for a “supreme Legislative, Judiciary, 
and Executive.” 1 Records, supra note 1, at 29 (May 30), 30–31 ( journal), 33 (Madison’s 
notes). 
79 E.g., Friedman, supra note 71, at 32 & n.177 (calling the interpretation “plausible”); 
Sager, supra note 65, at 30 (calling the interpretation “possible”); Strasser, supra note 70, at 
129, 136 (calling the interpretation “plausible”). Such speculation has arisen most often in 
the context of critiquing Justice Marshall’s holding in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803), that the Supreme Court could not exercise original jurisdiction over 
a mandamus petition. E.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Judicial Review: Its 
Legal and Historical Basis and Other Essays 5–6 (1914) (noting that Justice Marshall 
ignored this possible reading); Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers’ 
Constitution 81 (1988) (same); Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v Madison and Original Un-
derstandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 329, 397 
(“Why could [the Exceptions Clause] not, with perfect reason, be interpreted to mean that 
Congress may except matters from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction by assigning them to 
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 Writing together, Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson have argued 
that at least with respect to the three categories of the Extension Clause 
described as “all Cases” —they hedge their bets about Amar’s two-tier 
theory—Congress may not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction but 
instead may simply shift its form.80 Reading the Exceptions Clause “ho-
listically” and in the context of the rest of Article III,81 they insist that 
the clause is not a grant of congressional power at all.82 To them, the 
congressional power to make exceptions stems from the Necessary and 
Proper Clause; the Exceptions Clause simply serves as a reminder that 
Congress may use that power to rearrange jurisdictional form.83 As it 
could hardly be proper to eliminate the jurisdiction of the “supreme” 
Court (in that its very name implies the top of a hierarchy),84 they con-
clude that the conventional conception of the exceptions power is mis-
guided.85 
 The other scholar of late to champion the form-shifting view is 
Laurence Claus.86 He too focuses primarily on what the Supreme 
Court’s “suprem[acy]” entails, as well as on the Court’s singularity, to 
debunk the notion that the Exceptions Clause “lets Congress deprive the 
one supreme Court of jurisdiction over matters to which Article III ex-
                                                                                                                      
its original jurisdiction?”); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers 
of the Federal Courts, 1801–1835, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 646, 654 (1982) (“[T]he exceptions 
clause itself arguably authorized the grant of original mandamus jurisdiction: Congress 
had made an ‘exception’ to the appellate jurisdiction by providing original jurisdiction 
instead . . . .”); Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. 
Rev. 251, 262 (2005) (describing the clause and asking whether it might “mean that Con-
gress can transfer cases from the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to its original 
jurisdiction”); Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the 
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 Duke L.J. 1421, 1509 (calling this reading of the Excep-
tions Clause “less strained” than the conventional one); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical 
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1, 32 (characterizing this reading as “reason-
able” and “sensible” but not embracing it). 
80 Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and 
the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1002, 1006, 
1013, 1037 (2007). 
81 Id. at 1038. 
82 Id. at 1039–42. 
83 Id. at 1039–41. 
84 Id. at 1015–36 (relying on dictionaries and on parallels with the Appointments 
Clause of Article II and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, as well as on an analysis of the 
interchangeability of “Tribunals” of Article I and “Courts” of Article III). 
85 Id. at 1042. 
86 See generally Laurence Claus, Constitutional Guarantees of the Judiciary: Jurisdiction, Tenure, 
and Beyond, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 459 (2006) [hereinafter Claus, Constitutional Guarantees]; 
Laurence Claus, The One Court That Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and 
Article III, 96 Geo. L.J. 59 (2007) [hereinafter Claus, One Court]. 
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tends the judicial Power of the United States.”87 Like Calabresi and 
Lawson, Claus deems the Exceptions Clause to be largely redundant 
and cites the Necessary and Proper Clause as the source of the legisla-
ture’s exceptions power. Any attempt to strip (rather than transform) 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, he argues, would “change the Consti-
tution’s character” and thus fail to meet that Article I standard.88 
 Elsewhere in Article I, Claus finds helpful evidence in the Suspen-
sion Clause, arguing that in light of the specific provision for legislative 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, Congress could not be broadly 
allowed to achieve the same result by withdrawing jurisdiction to review 
detentions.89 As for Article III, he offers a useful review of the drafting 
history as further support.90 Interpreting the final text, he stresses the 
mandatory force of the word “shall” in the Vesting and Extension 
Clauses,91 decrying the anomaly that would result from vesting the “one 
supreme Court” with the federal judicial power, extending that judicial 
power to a carefully drawn set of cases, and then permitting the legisla-
ture to block that Court from hearing some of those cases:92 “If [a 
Court] has power to give ultimate judgment on only some Article III 
matters, then it is a supreme Court, but it is not the only one.”93 
 From my distinct interpretive perspective, it matters little whether 
one considers the Exceptions Clause to be a source of congressional 
power per se, and the nature of supremacy is largely irrelevant. Finding 
the text of Article III to be somewhat ambiguous, I emphasize the draft-
ing history to unlock its intended and understood meaning. Although 
these other iconoclastic scholars and I approach the topic from differ-
ent angles, however, we arrive at largely the same conclusions. Still, as 
Calabresi and Lawson lament, form-shifting theory has not yet “gained 
much traction in the academic community.”94 Perhaps that can change. 
                                                                                                                      
87 Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 61, 65. 
88 Id. at 79–80 (positing that the Exceptions Clause “merely acknowledges” that switch-
ing appellate jurisdiction to original jurisdiction is authorized by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause). 
89 Id. at 109–15. 
90 Id. at 81–87. 
91 Id. at 66–67, 73–74, 79. 
92 Id. at 67–73, 79 (explicating the nature of supremacy). But see Engdahl, Intrinsic Lim-
its, supra note 72, at 156–57 (arguing that Congress may or may not choose the “pyramidic” 
structure of federal courts and that word “supreme” was used to indicate the generality of 
jurisdiction rather than a hierarchical position). 
93 Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 69. 
94 Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 80, at 1008 n.27. 
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II. Textual and Contextual Form 
A. The Suggestive Context of Article III 
 Scholars have often analyzed the sentence containing the Appel-
late Jurisdiction and Exceptions Clauses in a vacuum, ignoring its pair-
ing with the Original Jurisdiction Clause in a paragraph focused on the 
Supreme Court.95 When they have mentioned the Original Jurisdiction 
Clause, it has been to point out how detached they find it to be from 
the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause.96 They have focused on twigs, such as 
dictionary definitions of the word “exception,” and on the grand forest 
of political ideals of the constitutional framers’ generation,97 but have 
ignored the clumps of trees in Article III. 
 The first words of the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause— “In all the 
other Cases before mentioned” —compel a contextual reading, simul-
taneously tying the sentence not only to the Original Jurisdiction Clause 
(which sets out the non-“other” cases) but also to the Extension Clause 
(which first “mention[s]” the cases). The subject of the Extension 
Clause, the “judicial Power,” in turn harks back to Article III’s first sec-
tion, which vests that power in the “supreme Court,” whose jurisdiction 
is later described in the paragraph with the Exceptions Clause. The first 
three paragraphs of Article III thus form a tight triangle of relationships. 
The judicial power flows in active form to the Court, which may wield it, 
and in passive form to the cases, in which it may be wielded, while the 
Original and Appellate Jurisdiction Clauses sketch the protocol about 
                                                                                                                      
95 E.g., Berger, supra note 70, at 285 (setting out the Appellate Jurisdiction and Ex-
ceptions Clauses, without any reference to the Original Jurisdiction Clause, at the begin-
ning of a chapter about the nature of the exceptions power); Blocher, supra note 50, at 
1003–04 (purportedly setting out the clause “[i]n context” while quoting only the sentence 
containing it); see also Redish, supra note 50, at 907, 913 (quoting the Appellate Jurisdic-
tion Clause as the “complete constitutional language” to be analyzed in defense of the 
conventional view of congressional power). But see Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 80, at 
1038–39 (“The allegedly ‘literal’ reading of the Exceptions Clause is superficially plausible 
only if one reads the Clause in isolation.”); Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 77–78 (not-
ing the interdependence of two sentences about the form of the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion). 
96 E.g., Harrison, supra note 48, at 249 (invoking the maxim “[e]xpressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius” to argue that although Congress has the power to control the Court’s ap-
pellate jurisdiction, it has none over its original jurisdiction); Meltzer, supra note 54, at 
1597 (concluding that because the Original Jurisdiction Clause lacks exceptions given to a 
subsequent clause, the phrase “shall have original Jurisdiction” appears “imperative”). 
97 E.g., Ratner, supra note 65, at 158 (advocating the “essential functions” interpreta-
tion as way to prevent Congress from “upset[ting] the delicately poised constitutional sys-
tem of checks and balances”); Rice, supra note 60, at 963–64 (claiming that the Exceptions 
Clause gave Congress a way to “check” judicial abuse). 
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how, or when, the Court interacts with each type of case: at the outset of 
the litigation, or only after other tribunals have had a say? 
 That mid-level contextual map of the Exceptions Clause’s terrain 
does not prove anything, but it shows that the orthodoxy has some ex-
plaining to do. By the time one reads Article III up to the Exceptions 
Clause, the judicial power has been vested in the Supreme Court and 
extended to the various cases; some cases have been singled out to ar-
rive at the Court originally, and the rest must await an appeal. Might an 
exception nullify the power already extended? Possibly; exceptions in-
herently go against the grain. But more naturally, to avoid internecine 
friction among constitutional provisions (not to mention branches of 
government), an exception would entail a promotion: instead of hav-
ing to proceed through local tribunals on the way to the Supreme 
Court for an exercise of the judicial power, some of the “other” cases 
may be selected for the express route. 
B. A (Hot and) Cold Reading of the Text 
 A reading informed by a holistic view of Article III is supported, if 
not compelled, by a closer look at the words of the paragraph about the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. To illustrate that support, an example of 
syntactically parallel non-legal language may be instructive. Imagine 
that a babysitter has been given the following rule (in bold, with com-
parable Article III language below): 
 
At dinner, the kids shall have hot food.
At other 
mealtimes, 
the kids shall have 
cold food, 
with such 
exceptions as you 
shall make. 
In all Cases affecting 
Ambassadors . . . , 
the supreme 
Court shall 
have original 
Jurisdiction. 
In all the other 
Cases before 
mentioned, 
the supreme Court 
shall have 
appellate 
Jurisdiction . . . , 
with such 
Exceptions . . . as 
the Congress 
shall make. 
 
 What “exceptions” may the babysitter make? A switch from cold 
food—the default type for meals other than dinner—to hot food would 
seem to be acceptable. In contrast, an interpretation allowing the baby-
sitter to make an “exception[]” by eliminating a meal altogether would 
be unreasonable. After all, the rule must be considered in light of a 
pertinent contextual principle, namely, that at mealtime, children eat a 
meal. 
 Likewise, a switch from appellate jurisdiction—the default type for 
cases other than the first ones listed—to original jurisdiction would 
seem to be acceptable. In contrast, the interpretation allowing Con-
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gress to make an “Exception[]” by eliminating jurisdiction in certain 
cases altogether is, in the context of Article III, dubious. The provisions 
must be considered in light of another explicit constitutional principle, 
namely, that the judicial power “vested” in the Supreme Court “ex-
tend[s]” to the “Cases” described. 
 In short, the question for Congress is not whether the Supreme 
Court may hear certain cases any more than that for the babysitter is 
whether the children will eat. The question in both instances is how : Will 
the children eat hot or cold food? Will the Court hear cases originally 
or on appeal? In these contexts, the word “exceptions” applies most 
comfortably to the words “cold” and “appellate” rather than “food” and 
“Jurisdiction.” Only wooden, if not grammatically farfetched, readings 
would permit depriving the Court of jurisdiction or the kids of food. 
 An example of analogous legal language may also be illuminating. 
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “any 
dismissal not under this rule—except one for lack of jurisdiction, im-
proper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19—operates as an 
adjudication on the merits.”98 Might the rule’s exception clause mean 
that dismissals for lack of jurisdiction and the like do not operate as 
“adjudication[s]”? Acontextual literalism would allow that interpreta-
tion, but a background principle prevents the error: as any reader of 
the rule knows, a dismissal is a type of adjudication. The clause thus 
applies instead to the modifying phrase “on the merits.” Likewise, as to 
Article III’s Exceptions Clause, the context provided by the Vesting and 
Extension Clauses suggests that the exceptions are to the “appellate” 
form, not to the “Jurisdiction” itself. 
 To be sure, the form-shifting interpretation is not the only one 
consistent with the text; facially, the orthodox view is not wholly im-
plausible.99 The history of the Original and Appellate Jurisdiction (and 
Exceptions) Clauses, however, dispels any doubt. As discussed below in 
Part III, the earliest draft of those provisions unambiguously addressed 
jurisdictional form. Through various edits, the once precise language 
gradually blurred, but only to accommodate collateral changes in Arti-
cle III—never to change the nature of “Exceptions.” 
                                                                                                                      
98 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
99 But cf. Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 80, at 1005 n.17 (noting Steven Calabresi’s 
opinion that the text of the Exceptions Clause unambiguously supports the form-shifting 
theory). 
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III. The Formation of the Exceptions Clause 
 It might seem surprising that the delegates in Philadelphia would 
“vest[]” the judicial power in the Supreme Court (and in inferior courts, 
if any) and “extend” that judicial power to nine categories of cases only 
to allow Congress to divest the Court of most of that power by making 
“Exceptions.” And indeed they did not. Though one noted scholar has 
proclaimed an academic consensus that “the intent of the framers with 
regard to the exceptions and regulations clause is indiscernible”100 and 
another has scoffed at an attempt to peer behind the purportedly “un-
ambiguous” (in support of the conventional view) text,101 the drafting 
history of the clause reveals its meaning and purpose. 
A. The Evolution of the Virginia Plan 
 On May 29, 1787, Edmund Randolph, the Governor of Virginia 
(and future first U.S. Attorney General, as well as second Secretary of 
State), presented to the Federal Convention the constitutional plan 
drafted by his state’s delegation.102 According to the most widely ac-
cepted source, the plan conceived of a “National Judiciary . . . to consist 
of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be cho-
sen by the National Legislature . . . .”103 The plan distinguished the 
roles of the two levels of courts only by jurisdictional form: “the juris-
diction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first 
instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the 
dernier resort,” a list of various cases, including “impeachments of any 
National officers.”104 As reported by an alternative source, the Virginia 
plan included the establishment of a “National Judiciary” and that 
                                                                                                                      
100 Friedman, supra note 71, at 34; see also Blocher, supra note 50, at 1004 (“[C]on-
stitutional history does not shed much light on the reasons for the [Exceptions] Clause’s 
placement or meaning of its words.”). 
101 Redish, supra note 50, at 907; see also id. at 910–11 (writing with mind “boggle[d]” 
and asking what “in Heaven’s name” supported another scholar’s sophisticated interpreta-
tion if not the bare text). 
102 See Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution 1787–1800, at 23–
24 (1950) (concluding that Madison was “undoubtedly” the author of the plan); William M. 
Meigs, The Growth of the Constitution in the Federal Convention of 1787, at 13 
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1987) (1900) (referring to Randolph as a figurehead); Stewart, 
supra note 6, at 36–38, 52–53 (describing the Virginians’ planning sessions, with Madison as 
the understood author). Randolph may have been chosen as the presenter at the Convention 
due to his “harmonious voice.” Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 58 
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) (1928). 
103 1 Records, supra note 1, at 15 (May 29), 21 (Madison’s notes). 
104 1 id. at 15 (May 29), 22 (Madison’s notes). 
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same list of cases, but did not address details such as types of courts or 
jurisdictional form.105 
 In any event, on June 5, the “Madisonian” compromise was struck; 
under the compromise, the Constitution would not establish inferior 
courts but would permit the legislature to do so.106 A week later, a mo-
tion was made proposing “[t]hat the jurisdiction of the supreme Tribu-
nal shall be to hear and determine in the dernier resort [various 
cases].”107 If one accepts the alternative version of the Virginia plan, the 
motion’s mention of “dernier resort” was the first reference to jurisdic-
tional form.108 That June 12 motion was not voted on, though. And af-
ter some wrangling about the categories of cases, the delegates post-
poned consideration of the judiciary resolution until the following 
                                                                                                                      
105 John Franklin Jameson, Studies in the History of the Federal Convention of 1787, in 1 
Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, at 87, 
106 (1903) (compiling the likely original version of Virginia plan). Jameson argued that 
the actual Virginia plan could not have included the composition of the judiciary. If it had, 
he contended, the notation of the journal on June 4 of a successful motion to “add” the 
language “[t]o consist of One supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals” 
would not have made sense. Id. at 103–06. In his widely cited Records, Max Farrand ac-
knowledged the unavailability of the original Virginia plan but cited several reasons in 
support of the version he published. 3 Records, supra note 1, at app. C, 593–94 (respect-
ing though disagreeing with Jameson’s different perspective). 
Law professors have unquestioningly accepted Farrand’s version without mentioning the 
historians’ debate. See, e.g., Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 80, at 1015 (relying on the Vir-
ginia plan’s call for “one or more supreme tribunals”); Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 68–
69 & n.41 (citing Farrand’s Records to support the proposition that the Convention rejected 
the idea of “multiple tribunals” of ultimate authority in favor of “one supreme Court”); Eng-
dahl, What’s in a Name?, supra note 72, at 464–65 & nn.30–38 (maintaining that Randolph’s 
proposal of “one or more” supreme courts helps show that supremacy did not indicate final 
authority); James E. Pfander, Federal Courts: Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to 
Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1452–53 & nn.79–81 (2000) (citing Farrand’s 
Records in a discussion of the Convention’s rejection of Randolph’s proposal of “one or more” 
supreme courts). 
106 1 Records, supra note 1, at 115 ( June 5), 118 ( journal), 127 (Yates’s notes). 
107 1 id. at 209 ( June 12), 211 ( journal), 220 (Madison’s notes). The precise list of 
cases was not spelled out in the records of the motion. See id. 
108 Randolph was not the only delegate to present a plan on May 29; so did South Caro-
lina’s Charles Pinckney. A document Pinckney later insisted was his plan provided that “[i]n 
cases of impeachment affecting Ambassadors & other public Ministers the [Supreme 
Court’s] Jurisdiction shall be original & in all the other cases appellate.” 3 id. at 595 (Pinck-
ney document), 600. Pinckney’s claim, however, has been discredited. 3 id. at 602–04 (ex-
plaining its practical impossibility). Though Pinckney’s original plan is lost to history, a re-
construction of its likely contents provides that “to [the federal judicial court] an Appeal 
shall be allowed from the judicial Courts of the several States in all Causes wherein Questions 
shall arise on [various issues].” 3 id. at 604 (reconstruction of the Pinckney plan), 608; see also 
2 id. at 134 (document found with the papers of the Committee of Detail apparently outlin-
ing the Pinckney plan), 136 (using same language). Thus, it is possible that Pinckney was the 
first delegate to refer to jurisdictional form, but in any event, his plan went nowhere. 
2010] A Return to Form for the Exceptions Clause 1405 
day,109 when the provision on jurisdiction was struck completely to allow 
a blank slate.110 
 Randolph and James Madison then advanced a resolution describ-
ing jurisdiction in a way that bypassed any mention of form: “That the 
jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases which respect 
the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national 
officers, and questions which involve the national peace and har-
mony.”111 Randolph referred to the “difficulty” of the previous day’s 
attempt to shape the powers of the judiciary and stressed that a com-
mittee would have the job of sorting out the details.112 The resolution 
passed unanimously,113 and the door was thus open for a later configu-
ration—or reconfiguration, under the standard account of the Virginia 
plan—of the jurisdictional posture in which the Supreme Court and 
inferior courts would hear those cases.114 The next month, as a member 
of the envisioned committee, Randolph would confidently stride 
through that door. 
 In the meantime, two days after the passage of Randolph and 
Madison’s resolution, William Paterson of New Jersey submitted a com-
peting plan for a new government, under which the judiciary would 
consist only of “a supreme Tribunal” that would hear impeachments of 
federal officers “in the first instance” and other cases “by way of appeal 
in the dernier resort.”115 The New Jersey plan thus offered the first ex-
plicit proposal for the Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdic-
tion.116 Soon after the introduction of the New Jersey plan, Alexander 
                                                                                                                      
109 1 id. at 209 ( June 12), 211–12 ( journal), 220 (Madison’s notes). 
110 1 id. at 223 ( June 13), 232 (Madison’s notes). 
111 1 id. at 223 ( June 13), 223–24 ( journal), 231 ( journal) (compilation of resolu-
tions), 232 (Madison’s notes). 
112 1 Records, supra note 1, at 223 ( June 13), 238 (Yates’s notes). 
113 Id. 
114 See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 54, at 722 (noting this effect of Randolph and 
Madison’s resolution). 
115 1 Records, supra note 1, at 241 ( June 15), 244 (Madison’s notes). 
116 See id. Some delegates, however—notably Pennsylvania’s James Wilson, who cata-
logued the differences between the Virginia and New Jersey plans—may have interpreted 
Randolph and Madison’s resolution as already having recommended original jurisdiction 
for the “national Judiciary” (which was not guaranteed to consist of anything but the Su-
preme Court). In Wilson’s outline of his speech summarizing differences between the 
plans, he noted that under the Virginia plan, “[t]he Jurisdiction of the national Tribunal” 
would extend to certain cases, whereas under the New Jersey plan, the national judiciary 
could hear such cases “[o]nly by Appeal in the dernier Resort” and would have “[o]nly 
limited and appellate Jurisdiction.” 1 id. at 248 ( June 16), 278 (Wilson’s notes). Madison 
and Hamilton each took notes of Wilson’s speech to the same effect. See 1 id. at 248 ( June 
16), 252 (Madison’s notes) (noting Wilson’s comment that the New Jersey plan called for 
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Hamilton expatiated on what the Constitution ought to contain; ac-
cording to his outline—which may or may not have been fully commu-
nicated to the Convention117—he advocated a court with “Supreme Ju-
dicial authority” that would have “original jurisdiction in all causes of 
capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in [other matters].”118 
 On June 19, the day after Hamilton’s speech, the Convention 
voted to move forward on the basis of the Virginia plan, as amended.119 
It would not be until a month later that the delegates reconsidered the 
resolution about jurisdiction. In the wake of a comment by Pennsyl-
vania’s Gouverneur Morris that national judges might not be able to 
give “the Executive” a fair trial,120 the reference to jurisdiction over im-
peachments was deleted,121 and at Madison’s behest, the category of 
cases about collection of national revenue was broadened to “all cases 
arising under the Natl. laws.”122 What would become the Extension 
Clause was taking shape, but the resolution still did not directly address 
jurisdictional form. Randolph and Madison had managed to duck that 
knotty issue before, but the proposals by Paterson and Hamilton 
showed that it was still on the minds of the delegates. The task of ad-
dressing that topic, and many others, fell, as Randolph had anticipated, 
to a committee; while other delegates vacated, the five-man Committee 
of Detail was to turn the amended resolutions of the Virginia plan into 
a working draft of a constitution.123 
B. The Committee of Detail’s Conception of the Exceptions Power 
 The Committee of Detail crafted the Extension Clause, fleshing 
out Randolph and Madison’s resolution to list eight types of cases com-
                                                                                                                      
“an appellate jurisdiction only”), 269 (Hamilton’s notes) (noting Wilson’s comment that 
the Virginia plan proposed “Orig: Jurisdiction in all cases of Nat: Rev.” while the New Jer-
sey plan proposed “None”). Apparently, the New Jersey plan’s provision for original juris-
diction over impeachments made little impact, at least on Wilson. 
117 1 id. at 281 ( June 18), 291 & n.7 (discussing uncertainty about the contents of 
Hamilton’s speech). 
118 1 id. at 281 ( June 18), 292 (Madison’s notes). 
119 1 id. at 312 ( June 19), 312 ( journal), 322 (Madison’s notes). 
120 2 id. at 37 ( July 18), 42 (Madison’s notes). 
121 2 Records, supra note 1, at 37 ( July 18), 39 ( journal), 46 (Madison’s notes). 
122 2 id. at 37 ( July 18), 46 (Madison’s notes). 
123 2 id. at 116 ( July 26), 117 ( journal), 128 (Madison’s notes). The Committee of De-
tail was formed on July 24 for the purpose of composing constitutional language reflecting 
the resolutions that had been passed by the full Convention. Membership included John 
Rutledge (chair), James Wilson, Edmund Randolph, Nathaniel Gorham, and Oliver Ells-
worth. See 2 id. at 97 ( July 24), 97 ( journal), 106 (Madison’s notes). 
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posing the “Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”124 The committee also 
addressed what form that jurisdiction would take, in the Original and 
Appellate Jurisdiction Clauses. Throughout the committee’s work, the 
role of exceptions remained constant: to shift jurisdictional form from 
appellate to original.125 
1. Edmund Randolph’s Composition 
 The first available draft of the document the Committee of Detail 
eventually reported to the full Convention was penned by Edmund 
Randolph.126 Randolph tackled the question of jurisdictional form that, 
until then, had been elusive. Although it was natural that most of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would be appellate, he recognized that 
some cases should be able to bypass other (inferior or state) courts. 
The earlier calls at the Convention for limited doses of original jurisdic-
tion in the highest court may have inspired him. Moreover, his passion 
about impeachments127 probably solidified his mindset that some cases 
were unsuited for other tribunals. 
 Randolph forcefully advocated a judicial role in impeachments of 
federal officers.128 Many delegates were skeptical of that idea, particu-
larly if the President would be appointing judges.129 A week before the 
committee met, Randolph had lost a battle when the Convention 
amended the Virginia plan’s resolution by eliminating the reference to 
federal jurisdiction over impeachments.130 But he would not surrender. 
                                                                                                                      
124 2 id. at 176 (Aug. 6), 186 (Madison’s notes) (report of the Committee of Detail). 
125 See Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 83 (noting that the Committee of Detail’s 
draft of the Exceptions Clause “sought only to distribute the Supreme Court’s already consti-
tutionally vested jurisdiction between original and appellate dockets”). 
126 See 4 Records, supra note 1, at 37 (Randolph draft) (transcribed from original). As 
with the Virginia plan, it is unclear to what extent Randolph himself formulated the ideas 
expressed by his hand. See Stewart, supra note 6, at 168–69 (speculating that the draft was 
a “joint product” of the committee and served as an outline of initial thoughts). 
127 During a discussion of whether the President ought to be impeachable, Randolph 
proclaimed the “[t]he propriety of impeachments” to be “a favorite principle” of his. 2 
Records, supra note 1, at 60 ( July 20), 67 (Madison’s notes). 
128 A week before the Convention adjourned, when Randolph expounded on a litany 
of perceived flaws in the Constitution, his first complaint was about “the Senate’s being 
made the Court of Impeachment for trying the Executive.” 2 id. at 555 (Sept. 10), 563 
(Madison’s notes). 
129 E.g., 2 id. at 37 ( July 18), 42 (Madison’s notes) (citing a statement by George Ma-
son that “[i]f the Judges were to form a tribunal for [trying impeachments], they surely 
ought not to be appointed by the Executive”); 2 id. at 544 (Sept. 8), 551 (Madison’s notes) 
(recording a comment of Roger Sherman that putting the impeachment power in the 
hands of judges appointed by the President would be “improper”). 
130 2 id. at 37 ( July 18), 39 ( journal), 46 (Madison’s notes). 
1408 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1383 
In the section of his committee draft that would evolve into Article II of 
the Constitution, he wrote that the executive would be “removeable on 
impeachment made by the house of representatives and conviction be-
fore the supreme judiciary,”131 and in the precursor to Article III, he 
accordingly restored the extension of federal jurisdiction to “impeach-
ments of officers.”132 As William Paterson had suggested in his plan, 
such cases were unsuited for inferior federal courts,133 so Randolph 
separated the jurisdictional provisions for the national judiciary into 
two numbered paragraphs. The Extension Clause and Original and 
Appellate Jurisdiction Clauses applied only to the “supreme tribunal,” 
and the “assignment clause” gave the legislature discretion to confer 
jurisdiction on inferior courts.134 
 Randolph must have realized that impeachments were not the 
only cases that should be able to go straight to the Supreme Court. 
Alexander Hamilton had suggested that fast track for cases of cap-
ture,135 and Pennsylvania’s James Wilson had given a speech interpret-
ing the amended Virginia plan as calling for it in many other cases.136 
Instead of defining the content of the Court’s original jurisdiction—he 
was being brazen enough by reinstating a judicial role in impeach-
ments, not to mention other ideas137—Randolph left Congress to de-
cide which cases warranted consideration in the first instance rather 
than, as earlier envisioned (in the June 12 motion, and perhaps in the 
Virginia plan), in the dernier resort.138 
                                                                                                                      
131 4 id. at 37 (Randolph draft), 46; 2 id. at 137 (Randolph draft), 145. Max Farrand’s 
version in volume 2 of Records is a transcription from a facsimile; his updated version in 
volume 4 uses slightly different punctuation based on a review of the original. 2 id. at 137 
n.6; 4 id. at 37 n.6. 
132 4 id. at 37 (Randolph draft), 48; 2 id. at 137 (Randolph draft), 146–47. 
133 1 Records, supra note 1, at 241 ( June 15), 244 (Madison’s notes) (detailing Pater-
son’s proposal to have the Supreme Court hear impeachments of federal officers “in the 
first instance”). 
134 4 id. at 37 (Randolph draft), 48; 2 id. at 137 (Randolph draft), 147. 
135 1 id. at 281 ( June 18), 292 (Madison’s notes). 
136 See supra note 116 (discussing Wilson’s speech). 
137 Randolph also toyed with giving the Supreme Court a veto power to void state laws. 
He, or perhaps someone else, crossed out that provision in his draft. 4 Records, supra 
note 1, at 37 (Randolph draft), 45 (“All laws of a particular state, repugnant hereto, shall 
be void: and . . . the decision thereon . . . shall be vested in the supreme judiciary . . . .”); 2 
id. at 137 (Randolph draft), 144. That idea evoked the Virginia plan’s ill-fated proposal to 
allow the national legislature to “negative” state laws conflicting with federal law. 1 id. at 15 
(May 29), 21 (Madison’s notes of the Virginia plan); see also 2 id. at 21 ( July 17), 21–22 
( journal), 28 (Madison’s notes) (noting the rejection of the proposal). 
138 4 id. at 37 (Randolph draft), 48; see also 2 id. at 137 (Randolph draft), 147. 
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 The creation of that legislative option was likely motivated by an-
other factor as well. Though Randolph fought to ensure the establish-
ment of inferior federal courts,139 he realized that under the Madison-
ian compromise, they might not exist. In some cases, such as those with 
international implications, it might be crucial to avoid state courts.140 If 
there were no inferior federal courts, that would leave only the Supreme 
Court. Leeway to add to its original jurisdiction would allow Congress to 
decide not only which cases could bypass any inferior federal courts but 
also, if there were none, which cases could still start (and end) in a fed-
eral court. 
 Whatever may have motivated Randolph, immediately following 
his Extension Clause defining the jurisdiction of the “supreme tribu-
nal,” he introduced a flexible provision about that jurisdiction’s form: 
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only, except in 
those instances, in which the legislature shall make it original: 
and the legislature shall organize it[.]141 
Thus was born the Exceptions Clause, leaving no doubt that it contem-
plated the legislative power as transformative rather than confiscatory.142 
2. John Rutledge’s Interlineation 
 In his review of Randolph’s draft, South Carolina’s John Rutledge, 
the chairman of the Committee of Detail (and future Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court), preserved the legislative ratchet from appellate to 
original form but, rather than leaving everything for Congress to de-
                                                                                                                      
139 Regardless of whether the Virginia plan did, as Max Farrand thought, include “infe-
rior tribunals,” Randolph showed his affinity for such courts a week after the Madisonian 
compromise in his motion (with Madison) to set out the “jurisdiction of the national Judici-
ary.” 1 id. at 223 ( June 13), 223–24 (journal), 231 (journal) (compilation of resolutions), 
232 (Madison’s notes). The scope of that motion contrasted with that of one made the day 
before (by an unknown delegate) that sought to cover merely the “jurisdiction of the su-
preme Tribunal.” 1 id. at 209 ( June 12), 211 (journal), 220 (Madison’s notes). 
140 See Paul M. Bator et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System 18 (3d ed. 1988) (noting that after the Madisonian compromise, “the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction took on new importance as the only available means 
of assuring access to a federal tribunal”). 
141 4 Records, supra note 1, at 37 (Randolph draft) (transcribed from original), 48; see 
also 2 id. at 137 (Randolph draft) (transcribed from facsimile), 147. 
142 Randolph did propose some measure of legislative control over the content of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction; he included in his Extension Clause certain “other cases, as 
the national legislature may assign.” 4 id. at 37 (Randolph draft), 48; see also 2 id. at 137 
(Randolph draft), 147; supra note 131 (explaining the different transcriptions in volumes 
2 and 4 of Records). That idea did not survive into the next draft. 
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cide, singled out one class of cases for constitutionally guaranteed 
original form (his addition is in angled brackets, with parentheses indi-
cating what someone crossed out): 
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only, except in 
<Cases of Impeachmt. & (in)> those instances, in which the 
legislature shall make it original: and the legislature shall or-
ganize it[.]143 
It was no surprise that the first cases to be assured of expedited review 
by the Supreme Court (though that status did not survive into the final 
Constitution) were impeachments. 
 Rutledge’s inserted language was grammatically detached from 
Randolph’s word “original,” creating a second prong of exceptions; the 
legislature would not need to “make” jurisdiction over impeachments 
original. Nonetheless, Rutledge did not see a need to specify that the 
exception for cases of impeachment would entail “original” jurisdiction. 
That much was obvious in that the jurisdiction would not “be appellate.” 
3. James Wilson’s Rearrangement 
 The other available coherent draft of the Committee of Detail’s 
eventual report to the full Convention was in the hand of Rutledge’s 
frequent host during the summer, Philadelphian James Wilson.144 Wil-
son’s draft used Randolph’s as a starting point, retaining the same basic 
structure of the judiciary article, while slightly expanding the list of 
cases in the Extension Clause.145 Wilson kept Rutledge’s constitutional 
floor of original jurisdiction in cases of impeachment and built on that 
framework by adding two other categories. His language about jurisdic-
tional form spread over two sentences: 
                                                                                                                      
143 4 id. at 37 (Randolph draft) (transcribed from original), 37 n.6, 48; see also 2 id. at 
137 (Randolph draft) (transcribed from facsimile), 137 n.6, 147; supra note 131 (explain-
ing the different transcriptions in volumes 2 and 4 of Records). 
144 Stewart, supra note 6, at 38, 165 (noting that Rutledge often stayed at Wilson’s 
home). Other relevant documents written by Wilson are more fragmented and do not ad-
dress the exceptions power. See 2 Records, supra note 1, at 150 (partial draft of an outline), 
152 (draft of portions of the eventual report), 159 (draft of portions of the eventual report). 
Although the recent rediscovery of the original of one of those documents was hailed as a 
historical bonanza, Edward Colimore, Early Draft of the Constitution Found in Phila., Phila. 
Inquirer, Feb. 2, 2010, at A02, the document contains nothing substantive about the judici-
ary. See 2 Records, supra note 1, at 150–52, cited in Questions About Lorianne Updike Toler’s Re-
discovery of James Wilson’s 3rd Draft of the Constitution, ConSource, http://www.consource.org/ 
WilsonDraftQuestions (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
145 2 Records, supra note 1, at 163 (Wilson draft), 172–73. 
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In Cases of Impeachment, those affecting Ambassadors and 
other public Ministers, and those in which a State shall be one 
of the Parties, this Jurisdiction shall be original. In all the 
other Cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such 
Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Legislature 
shall make.146 
 Wilson’s interruption of Randolph’s provision with a period would 
spawn misunderstanding by those reading the Exceptions Clause in the 
sole context of the sentence about appellate jurisdiction, ignoring the 
textual link to the one about original jurisdiction. But a second sen-
tence was almost inevitable in light of the extra substance that Rutledge 
and then Wilson added to Randolph’s draft: three types of cases in 
which the form of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would be fixed by 
the Constitution as original. Merely interlineating rather than writing a 
new draft on a clean sheet, Rutledge had crudely inserted the category 
of impeachments into Randolph’s single sentence; the meaning was 
clear enough. When Wilson added the foreign diplomat and state-party 
cases, though, eloquence demanded that the constitutional floor have 
its own sentence.147 
 Wilson’s syntactic choice avoided the awkward joinder of two types 
of exceptions that might otherwise have resulted from preserving 
Randolph’s sentence structure: “[T]his supreme jurisdiction shall be 
appellate only, except [1] in cases of impeachment, cases affecting 
[foreign diplomats], and those in which a state shall be a party, and [2] 
in those instances in which the legislature shall make it original . . . .”148 
                                                                                                                      
146 2 id. at 163 (Wilson draft), 173. Rutledge edited this draft slightly as well, without 
changing the substance. See id. 
147 In a document drafted by Charles Pinckney that he later purported to be the plan 
he had presented on May 29 but that has been shown instead to be essentially a synopsis of 
the Committee of Detail’s report—a report that was almost identical to Wilson’s draft—
Pinckney included the constitutional floor of original jurisdiction but excluded the excep-
tions power. Without that complicating factor, he comfortably combined the Original and 
Appellate Jurisdiction Clauses into a single sentence focused only on jurisdictional form: 
“In cases of impeachment affecting Ambassadors & other public Ministers the Jurisdiction 
shall be original & in all the other cases appellate.” 3 id. at 595 (Pinckney document), 600, 
602–04 (refuting Pinckney’s claim that the document was his original plan). Pinckney’s 
omission of the exceptions power may reflect the insignificance of that power, and in any 
event, his skeletal paraphrasing of Wilson’s two sentences shows that they were understood 
as establishing the form, rather than the existence, of jurisdiction. 
148 Moreover, had Wilson strung together the two sentences he actually wrote, with a 
comma and an “and” rather than a period, people might have mistakenly concluded that 
the legislature could make exceptions not only to the appellate form but also to the consti-
tutional floor of original jurisdiction. 
1412 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1383 
Much tidier was Wilson’s devotion of a whole sentence to the new ele-
ment, a floor of original jurisdiction. The old elements—the default 
form of jurisdiction as appellate and Congress’s power to shift that de-
fault—became the second sentence. The corollary that an exception to 
appellate form would result in original form was implicit.149 
a. Akhil Amar’s Illusions of Disappearance and Appearance 
 In support of his theory of mandatory federal jurisdiction for “all 
Cases” but not “Controversies,” Akhil Amar has criticized the notion 
that the exceptions power sketched by Randolph survived into Wilson’s 
draft.150 He acknowledges that Randolph had proposed “explicit” legis-
lative authority to expand the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.151 
But according to Amar, in Wilson’s draft, that power “disappeared.”152 
                                                                                                                      
149 See Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 84 (arguing that Wilson’s draft permitted ex-
ceptions to the “appellate nature” rather than the “existence” of the jurisdiction). 
150 Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 53, at 214–15 n.39 (criticizing the speculative interpre-
tation proffered by Robert Clinton in Clinton, supra note 71, at 778, 793, 827). 
151 Id.; see also Amar, supra note 76, at 467 (noting that Randolph’s draft “would have 
allowed Congress to shift cases from the Court’s appellate to its original docket”). 
152 Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 53, at 214 n.39 (finding the recasting of the provision to 
be at least as likely to mean that the five-man committee affirmatively “sought to prevent 
additions to the Court’s original jurisdiction” as to mean that Randolph’s form-shifting 
mechanism endured); see also Amar, supra note 76, at 467 (arguing that the failure of 
Randolph’s language to “c[o]me out of committee” undermines the notion that Randolph’s 
idea was perpetuated). Robert Clinton, another mandatory federal jurisdiction theorist, 
also characterizes the congressional power to reconfigure appellate jurisdiction into original 
form as having “disappeared” after the Randolph draft. Clinton, supra note 71, at 777–78 
(allowing for the possibility that the authority survived in less explicit form); see also Dodge, 
supra note 68, at 1023 (interpreting Wilson’s change to Randolph’s language as eliminating 
the power to increase the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction). 
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Comparison of Randolph-Rutledge (top) and Wilson (bottom) Drafts 
(new substantive material in italics) 
 
 In fact, as shown by the table above, Wilson’s draft simply restated 
his colleagues’ thoughts about jurisdictional form in a slightly different 
way.153 Randolph’s provision had featured two components: (1) the de-
fault form of jurisdiction as appellate and (2) Congress’s power to 
make exceptions to that form. Rutledge had wedged in a third: (11/2) 
the constitutional floor of original jurisdiction. Wilson simply extracted 
(and supplemented with two new categories) Rutledge’s addition, mak-
ing it the lead sentence and reuniting Randolph’s two components in 
the next sentence. Because the new sentence about “original” jurisdic-
tion would be read first, Wilson had no need to mention that word 
again in the reassembled second sentence, and so “except in . . . those 
                                                                                                                      
153 See Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 82–83 (“[T]he text affords no reason to infer 
that Wilson’s draft, any more than the Rutledge edit to Randolph’s, meant to preclude 
congressional additions to that original jurisdiction.”). As Claus has pointed out, the like-
lihood that one committee member (Randolph) intended his version of the language to 
allow Congress to switch jurisdiction from appellate to original while another member 
(Wilson) intended his quite similar version to do something wholly different is “negligi-
ble.” Id. 
except in Cases of 
Impeachmt. & 
[except in] those 
instances, in which the 
legislature shall make it 
original . . . . 
In Cases of 
Impeachment, those 
affecting Ambassadors 
and other public 
Ministers, and those in 
which a State shall be one 
of the Parties, this 
Jurisdiction shall be 
original. 
 
 
In all the other Cases 
beforementioned, it 
shall be appellate, 
 
 
with such Exceptions 
. . . as the Legislature 
shall make. 
But this supreme 
jurisdiction shall be 
appellate only, 
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instances, in which the legislature shall make it original” became “with 
such Exceptions . . . as the Legislature shall make.”154 
 The rewrite thus understandably did not spell out explicitly that an 
exception to appellate jurisdiction would make it original. Yet Amar 
finds that shortcut to be notable: “[D]oesn’t the very existence of the 
Exceptions Clause make all the more significant the omission of an 
‘Additions Clause’ (‘with such additions as the Congress shall make’) 
from the grant of original jurisdiction?”155 He argues against the form-
shifting reading on the ground that it would make the Exceptions 
Clause work overtime, “do[ing] two things simultaneously,” in effecting 
both a subtraction (of appellate jurisdiction) and an addition (of origi-
nal jurisdiction).156 But that protest vanishes if the role of the passage in 
question is to allocate when jurisdiction will be original and when ap-
pellate; with that understanding, an exception to “appellate” is but a 
one-step shift to “original.” 
 To insist that the Exceptions Clause would need a complementary 
Additions Clause to transform jurisdiction is to ignore the development 
of the relevant language from Randolph’s draft, as emended by 
Rutledge and then rearranged by Wilson. With his streamlined phras-
ing, Wilson did not need to repeat the word “original” any more than 
Rutledge had needed to specify the form of jurisdiction in cases of im-
peachment. In both situations, what else would an exception to “shall 
be appellate” mean?157 Attributing to Wilson a dissolution of the legisla-
tive power to expand original jurisdiction is tantamount to maintaining 
that Rutledge had relegated cases of impeachment to tribunals other 
than the Supreme Court. In short, there is no basis for Amar’s claim 
                                                                                                                      
154 2 Records, supra note 1, at 163 (Wilson draft), 173. Randolph also had included a 
directive to the legislature to “organize” the jurisdiction; Wilson changed that word to 
“Regulat[e].” See infra notes 260–271 and accompanying text (discussing the likely import 
of those terms). 
155 Amar, supra note 76, at 465. 
156 Id. (finding a lack of a “textual basis” for the addition). 
157 See John Norton Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of 
the United States §§ 732, 497 (4th ed. 1879) (“[J]urisdiction of all kinds is either origi-
nal or appellate.”). The Committee of Detail left the obvious ramifications of other excep-
tions unspecified as well. For example, its draft provided that “[t]he trial of all criminal 
offences (except in cases of impeachments) . . . shall be by Jury.” 2 Records, supra note 1, 
at 176 (Aug. 6), 177 (Madison’s notes) (report of the Committee of Detail), 187. In that 
draft, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction extended to cases of impeachments. 2 id. at 186. 
But the committee saw no need in the clause about criminal trials to spell out that an ex-
ception to “shall be by Jury” would mean “shall be by judges.” See 2 id. at 187. 
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that Wilson’s draft of the Exceptions Clause abandoned the constitu-
tional plan that had been, as Amar admits,158 clear in Randolph’s. 
 In light of the metamorphosis perceived by Amar, his assertion that 
“the exceptions and regulations clause made its initial appearance” in 
Wilson’s draft is no surprise.159 In a narrow sense it did, in that the 
words “Exceptions” and “Regulations” first appeared in tandem there.160 
But to overlook the inception of the clause in Randolph’s draft is to miss 
the clearest view of the import of an exception.161 
b. Robert Clinton’s Specious Parallelism 
 Robert Clinton, another adherent of mandatory federal jurisdic-
tion (without the gloss of Amar’s two tiers), also portrays the Exceptions 
Clause as having originated in Wilson’s draft.162 Clinton finds signifi-
cance in its appearance alongside a “parallel”163 provision—the “assign-
ment clause” —that would have allowed the legislature to distribute the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to inferior courts “in the Manner and un-
der the Limitations which it shall think proper.”164 That provision arose 
in Randolph’s draft, but Wilson eliminated the specification that the 
inferior courts would sit “as original tribunals.”165 In Clinton’s view, the 
deletion showed that, to Wilson (and eventually to the rest of the five-
man Committee of Detail), the assignment clause would “comple-
                                                                                                                      
158 Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 53, at 214 n.39. 
159 Id. Amar is far from alone in that characterization. See, e.g., Engdahl, What’s in a 
Name?, supra note 72, at 487 (calling the Wilson draft’s sentence about appellate jurisdic-
tion “the first appearance, in any records surviving the Convention, of language resem-
bling the so-called ‘exceptions’ clause”); Sager, supra note 65, at 51 & n.98 (“The excep-
tions and regulations language first appears in [Wilson’s] draft . . . .”); cf. Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal Sys-
tem 18 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that the exceptions power “is foreshadowed in Randolph’s 
draft . . . and then appears in [Wilson’s draft]”); Beck, supra note 66, at 790 (referring to 
Wilson’s language as “a new version of the predecessor language”). 
160 Randolph’s draft referred to “organiz[ation]” rather than “Regulation[].” See infra 
notes 260–271 and accompanying text (discussing the likely import of those terms). 
161 See Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 81 (citing Randolph’s draft as containing the 
“first reference to a congressional power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s ap-
pellate jurisdiction”). 
162 Clinton, supra note 71, at 776 (“Th[e Wilson] draft . . . contained the first emer-
gence of the ‘exceptions and regulations clause’. . . .”). 
163 Id. at 777. 
164 2 Records, supra note 1, at 163 (Wilson draft), 173. 
165 See 4 id. at 37 (Randolph draft), 48 (“The whole or a part of the jurisdiction afore-
said, according to the discretion of the legislature, may be assigned to the inferior tribu-
nals, as original tribunals.”); accord 2 id. at 137 (Randolph draft), 147; see also supra note 
131 (explaining the different transcriptions in volumes 2 and 4 of Records). 
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ment[]” the purportedly new Exceptions Clause: one clause permitted 
Congress to take appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court, and 
the other to give it to inferior courts.166 Clinton cites that coupling as 
evidence supporting his theory that the function of the exceptions 
power was to permit Congress to redirect cases to inferior courts.167 
 The history and wording of Wilson’s draft, however, controvert the 
supposed symbiosis between the congressional powers (1) to make ex-
ceptions to the mandate that (in the “other” cases) the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction “shall be appellate” and (2) to assign168 parts of the 
Court’s jurisdiction to an inferior court. As discussed above, Randolph 
had already broken ground on the Exceptions Clause.169 So the claim 
that its utility depended on Wilson’s deletion of the reference to infe-
rior courts as “original tribunals” is anachronistic. Regardless, the rele-
vance of the deletion is questionable in that Clinton does not explain 
why jurisdiction taken from the Supreme Court would have to stay in 
the appellate form when conferred on an inferior court. 
 Moreover, though Wilson joined the powers of assignment and 
exceptions in the same paragraph,170 he did not have each depend on 
the other. Nothing made exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction contingent on the existence of inferior courts. Conversely, 
Congress could assign jurisdiction to inferior courts without touching 
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Even if an assignment would 
have divested the Supreme Court rather than leaving it with concurrent 
jurisdiction—a plausible though dubious interpretation171—the as-
                                                                                                                      
166 Clinton, supra note 71, at 792 n.167. 
167 Id. at 777; see also id. at 753 (“The power to make exceptions was at most an alloca-
tive authority designed to facilitate the creation of inferior federal courts.”). 
168 Wilson amended Randolph’s word “assign[]” to “distribute”; Rutledge later changed 
it back to “assign.” 2 Records, supra note 1, at 163 (Wilson draft), 173. 
169 See supra notes 126–142 and accompanying text. 
170 2 Records, supra note 1, at 163 (Wilson draft), 173. Randolph had numbered the 
two provisions separately. 4 id. at 37 (Randolph draft), 48; accord 2 id. at 137 (Randolph 
draft), 147; see also supra note 131 (explaining the different transcriptions in volumes 2 and 
4 of Records). 
171 The assignment clause was not entirely clear on that point. Randolph’s provision 
that “[t]he whole” of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction—appellate and original—could be 
assigned, however, implied that the Court would have retained concurrent jurisdiction. 
Otherwise, assignment would have been a way for Congress in essence to eliminate the 
Court itself. Wilson’s draft was less emphatic, noting only that the legislature “may distrib-
ute this Jurisdiction . . . .” 2 Records, supra note 1, at 163 (Wilson draft), 173. Rutledge 
then edited the quoted language to “may assign any part of the Jurisdiction” (though he 
carved out an exception for “Trial of the Executive”). Id. Presumably, the three drafters for 
the committee agreed that all cases in the Extension Clause (aside from Rutledge’s excep-
 
2010] A Return to Form for the Exceptions Clause 1417 
signment could have been of original jurisdiction, which was not subject 
to exceptions. That an assignment did not need a complementary ex-
ception dispels the notion that the role of exceptions was to facilitate 
assignments. 
 Instead of working in tandem, the two powers played disparate 
roles: one allowed the transformation of the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion (from appellate to original), whereas the other allowed the trans-
fer or sharing of it (to or with inferior courts). The eventual deletion of 
the assignment clause, once its description of inferior courts’ potential 
jurisdiction was obviated by a change at the beginning of the Extension 
Clause,172 helped confirm that Wilson’s side-by-side placement of the 
provisions had not been fraught with unstated meaning.173 
 Rather than (as Clinton insists) tying the two provisions together, 
Wilson’s omission of Randolph’s specification that inferior courts 
would sit “as original tribunals” clarified the role of those courts. 
Randolph may have used the word “original” to convey that their deci-
sions would be the first by a federal court and thus subject to appellate 
review by the Supreme Court, not contemplating that the word might 
also imply that they could not hear cases from state courts.174 Or he 
may have intended it to contrast with the “appellate only” default juris-
diction of the Supreme Court and thus to mean “not only appellate but 
also original.”175 It is even conceivable that he thought inferior courts 
should not hear appeals from state courts. Whatever Randolph’s reason 
was for including the phrase “as original tribunals,” Wilson evidently 
found it substantively or stylistically undesirable. Contrary to Clinton’s 
claim, Wilson’s deletion of that qualifier about inferior courts in no way 
                                                                                                                      
tion) were fair game for inferior courts without contemplating a back-door method of 
eliminating the one court that was constitutionally guaranteed. 
172 See infra note 181 (surveying scholars’ explanations of the assignment clause’s dele-
tion). 
173 Evading that implication, Clinton argues that the deletion of the assignment clause 
infused the Exceptions Clause with a grant of legislative power to confer jurisdiction on 
inferior courts. See infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
174 Even today, the phrase “original jurisdiction” does not unambiguously preclude re-
view of other courts’ decisions. For example, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to re-
view the constitutionality of a state court criminal judgment is considered as initiating an 
“original” proceeding in a federal district court that serves the purpose of reviewing the 
state judgment. See Clinton, supra note 71, at 753 n.22 (noting the imprecision of the ter-
minology of jurisdictional form). 
175 Randolph may have taken for granted that in the types of cases important enough 
to warrant legislative action permitting original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, the 
Court would retain appellate jurisdiction as necessary to correct state court decisions. Cf. 
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 395, 405 (1821) (holding that cases within the 
Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Clause are also subject to its appellate jurisdiction). 
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changed the meaning of the separate clause permitting exceptions to 
the directive that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction—in the words of both 
Randolph and Wilson— “shall be appellate.” 
C. The Convention’s Revisions 
 James Wilson’s rearrangement of Edmund Randolph’s provision 
about jurisdictional form into two sentences was only the beginning of 
the devolution of the Exceptions Clause from unequivocal perspicuity 
to unwitting ambiguity. After John Rutledge lightly edited Wilson’s 
draft, adding “Consuls” to the category of cases affecting “Ambassadors 
and other public Ministers,”176 the Committee of Detail gave its report 
to the full Convention.177 If editing by committee is problematic, edit-
ing by convention can be calamitous. As described below, the Conven-
tion proceeded to deform the phrase “shall be appellate,” unintention-
ally compounding interpreters’ eventual confusion. 
1. Expansion of the Extension Clause 
 On August 27 the Convention focused on the judiciary. The con-
troversial jurisdictional category of impeachments, which may have 
been the reason Randolph’s draft contained a paragraph devoted to 
the jurisdiction of only the Supreme Court,178 was “postponed,” never 
to return to the Extension Clause.179 The jurisdictional scopes of the 
Supreme Court and inferior courts were then combined, as the subject 
of the Extension Clause changed from the “jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court” to the “Judicial Power,”180 embracing all Article III courts. The 
assignment clause, which would have permitted the legislature to con-
fer jurisdiction on inferior courts, was then deleted, its reference to the 
                                                                                                                      
176 2 Records, supra note 1, at 163, 173 (Wilson draft, with Rutledge’s additions in an-
gled brackets). 
177 The report was, aside from capitalization and the like, identical to Wilson’s draft as 
edited by Rutledge. 2 id. at 176 (Aug. 6), 186 (Madison’s notes) (report of the Committee 
of Detail). 
178 See supra notes 127–134 and accompanying text. 
179 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 423, 424 ( journal), 430, 431 (Madison’s 
notes) (noting the postponement of consideration of the impeachment provisions in the 
Extension and Original Jurisdiction Clauses); see Charles L. Black, Jr., Impeachment: A 
Handbook 57–59 (1974) (noting the permanent disappearance of impeachment cases 
from Article III once the Convention “moved impeachment trials out of the Supreme 
Court and into the Senate”). The only judicial role that remained was that the Chief Jus-
tice would preside over an impeachment trial of the President. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3. 
180 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal) (“Judicial Power”), 431 
(Madison’s notes) (“Judicial power”). 
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types of cases they could hear having been obviated by the newly 
broadened subject of the Extension Clause.181 
 Defenders of theories of mandatory federal jurisdiction have made 
much of the shift to “Judicial Power.” In the view of Akhil Amar, who 
subscribes to such a theory for one “tier” of disputes (those described 
as “all Cases” rather than “Controversies”), that edit was “[t]he key tex-
tual change” turning the Exceptions Clause into a grant of legislative 
power to shift cases in that tier to inferior courts; previously, he ex-
plains, such a shift would have contravened the Extension Clause.182 To 
Amar, the widening of the Extension Clause’s scope diminished the 
Supreme Court’s power, in that jurisdiction over the various “Cases” in 
his “mandatory” tier would now be guaranteed only in either the Su-
preme Court or an inferior court.183 
 In other words, Amar asks us to believe that the editing of the Ex-
tension Clause transformed the Exceptions Clause from a provision allow-
ing withdrawal of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in favor of 
state or other federal courts, but only as to his tier of “permissive” 
cases—already a stretch, in that no version of the Exceptions Clause 
had (or has) ever evoked the putative tiers—into a provision allowing 
(1) such unrestricted withdrawal of “permissive” cases and also 
(2) withdrawal of “mandatory” cases but only in favor of other federal 
courts. Recall that a month before this development, Randolph had 
composed the first version of the exceptions power, which as Amar ac-
knowledges would have permitted the expansion of original jurisdic-
tion; in the later draft by Wilson, under Amar’s roller-coaster reading, 
                                                                                                                      
181 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal), 431 (Madison’s notes). Most scholars have sur-
mised that the reason for the deletion of the assignment clause was redundancy, in that 
“[t]he Judicial Power” encompassed the jurisdiction of all Article III courts. E.g., Claus, 
One Court, supra note 86, at 85 (calling the clause “surplusage”); Engdahl, What’s in a 
Name?, supra note 72, at 488 n.159 (opining that the assignment clause “ceased to be cru-
cial” once the “Judicial Power” edit was made); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme 
Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 555, 621 (1994) (calling the 
clause “redundant”); Ratner, supra note 65, at 164 n.34 (calling the clause “superfluous” as 
a result of the change to “Judicial Power”); Velasco, supra note 48, at 733 (calling the 
clause “unnecessary”). It is also possible that whereas the assignment clause would have 
given Congress control over the extent of inferior courts’ jurisdiction, its deletion, along 
with the concomitant shift to “[t]he Judicial Power,” signaled protection of that jurisdic-
tion (albeit not the courts themselves) from legislative elimination. In other words, 
whereas the description of the (potential) jurisdiction simply moved, the discretion given to 
the legislature (beyond the question of whether to establish inferior courts at all) may have 
been eliminated. 
182 Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 53, at 241 n.120. 
183 See id. at 214 n.39, 241 n.120. 
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that power had “disappeared.”184 With the August 27 twist of the trickle-
down effect from the emendation of the Extension Clause, Amar con-
tinues to ask too much, particularly when a straightforward interpreta-
tion of the development of the Exceptions Clause is available, under 
which its form-shifting function never wavered. 
 Robert Clinton, advocating a tier-free theory of guaranteed juris-
diction for all listed cases in some Article III court, also has argued that 
the rewording of the Extension Clause affected the Exceptions Clause, 
but with a take somewhat different from Amar’s: 
Once the described jurisdiction was applicable to the judicial 
power of the United States as a whole, . . . “exceptions” from 
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could be 
made only by vesting jurisdiction over the omitted class of 
cases in an inferior federal court . . . . Otherwise, the deletion 
of the power to assign jurisdiction to the inferior federal 
courts would have left Congress without any explicit grant of 
authority in the judiciary article to so allocate the judicial 
power of the United States.185 
 Article III indeed lacks the explicit grant of congressional author-
ity Clinton seeks. One response is that the authority resides in the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause of Article I.186 An alternative is that perhaps 
the authority does not exist, and the jurisdiction of inferior courts is 
constitutionally guaranteed by the Extension Clause.187 Clinton’s co-
nundrum is thus a contrived one. Regardless, his resolution of it is un-
convincing. If, as he suggests, the only way to invest inferior federal 
courts with jurisdiction were through exceptions to the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, then the inferior courts’ decisions would 
be unreviewable. Yet on the day the Extension Clause was expanded, a 
motion had earlier been made proposing that in cases within the Su-
preme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, “original jurisdiction shall be in 
the Courts of the several States.”188 That proposal was quickly with-
drawn in favor of a successful motion settling the Appellate Jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                      
184 Id. at 214 n.39; see supra notes 150–161 and accompanying text. 
185 Clinton, supra note 71, at 793 (emphasis added). 
186 See, e.g., Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 80, at 1041 & n.159 (surmising that the 
clause allows Congress to “set [the] jurisdiction” of inferior courts). 
187 See supra note 181 (speculating that deletion of the assignment clause may have 
eliminated legislative control of inferior courts’ jurisdiction). A thorough discussion of 
that possibility is beyond the scope of this Article. 
188 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 424 ( journal). 
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Clause in close to its final form.189 Had the delegates intended to insu-
late the decisions of inferior federal courts from review in the Supreme 
Court, they easily could have retained the withdrawn language, but in-
stead they left open the possibility that cases on appeal to the Supreme 
Court might have originated in such courts.190 
 In short, Clinton’s claim that the shift from “jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court” to “Judicial Power” in the Extension Clause changed the 
role of the Exceptions Clause is not plausible. There is no reason to 
doubt that the Exceptions Clause maintained its long-settled transfor-
mative function or to think that as a result of the shift, exceptions could 
be exercised only in conjunction with the establishment of inferior 
courts. 
 Despite his word “only” in the paragraph quoted above, Clinton 
does elsewhere allow, unlike most observers, that even if the principal 
role of the Exceptions Clause is to move cases to inferior courts, excep-
tions might also change jurisdiction from appellate to original form.191 
Conventional scholars who discount that possibility have been misled 
by other ramifications of the expansion of the Extension Clause to “Ju-
dicial Power.” That expansion spawned minor clarifying edits to the 
Original and Appellate Jurisdiction Clauses. Though innocuous at the 
time, the edits exacerbated the effects of James Wilson’s split of the 
provision about jurisdictional form into two sentences and led to misin-
terpretations of the Exceptions Clause, as discussed below. 
2. Clarification of the Original Jurisdiction Clause 
 With the revision of the Extension Clause, the reference in the 
succeeding sentence to “this jurisdiction” (which “shall be original”) 
became muddled in that the antecedent “jurisdiction” had turned into 
“Judicial Power.” Many scholars have relied on a distinction between 
those terms to bolster the conventional view of the exceptions power; 
because the Extension Clause confers judicial power rather than juris-
diction, the argument goes, interpreting the Exceptions Clause to allow 
the elimination of jurisdiction does not pit one constitutional clause 
against another.192 To be sure, the terms are not synonyms— “Judicial 
Power” is broader than “jurisdiction” —but a court’s judicial power with 
                                                                                                                      
189 Id. 
190 See id. (omitting reference to the original forum of cases within the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction). 
191 Clinton, supra note 71, at 778, 793 (acknowledging that reading without adopting 
or rejecting it). 
192 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (summarizing scholars’ arguments). 
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respect to a given case is inoperative without jurisdiction. The delegates 
could not have anticipated that the Supreme Court could end up hav-
ing one without the other. 
 Still, it would have been awkward to refer back to “Judicial Power” 
with “this jurisdiction”; a minor edit was in order. Moreover, the change 
to “Judicial Power” simultaneously deleted the qualifier “of the Su-
preme Court” and thus broadened the scope of the Extension Clause 
to include the potential inferior courts in which that power would be 
vested.193 Would the phrase “this jurisdiction” refer to the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court, or of all federal courts? 
 To clear up the confusion, the delegates immediately edited the 
affected passage to refocus it on the Supreme Court (italics mark addi-
tions and strikethroughs deletions): 
In [two types of] cases . . . , this jurisdiction [t]he supreme Court 
shall be have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases . . . , it 
shall be appellate . . . , with such exceptions . . . as the Legisla-
ture shall make.194 
Those changes solved the syntactical problem posed by “this jurisdic-
tion.” They were so minor that James Madison, who kept the most 
thorough notes at the Convention, did not even record them, let alone 
summarize any discussion.195 But another problem had arisen. The sec-
ond sentence of the passage no longer mirrored the first in structure, 
                                                                                                                      
193 The “jurisdiction” of inferior courts was still at that time subject to the assignment 
clause, 2 Records, supra note 1, at 176 (Aug. 6), 186 (report of the Committee of Detail) 
(Madison’s notes), which was deleted later in the day, 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal), 
431 (Madison’s notes). 
194 See 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal) (recording the passage of the motion re-
sulting in the above edits). 
195 The only recorded discussion from August 27 about the passage concerned whether 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would “extend[] to matters of fact as well as law—and to 
cases of Common law as well as Civil law.” 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 431 (Madison’s notes). Wil-
son commented that he believed it would, on both counts. Id.; see infra notes 286–289 and 
accompanying text (discussing the impact of that clarification). No discussion on that day or 
any other referred to a possibility that the exceptions might permit the elimination of juris-
diction. 
Ralph Rossum reads that absence as support for the orthodox view: “No questions 
were raised concerning Congress’ plenary power to make exceptions. The conclusion is 
inescapable: both the words chosen by the delegates and the discussion surrounding their 
choice of these words suggest an unlimited congressional power over the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction.” Rossum, supra note 48, at 393. But of course no questions were raised about 
that power; the power did not exist. The absence of a clear statement one way or another 
at the Convention by the delegates proves nothing but the necessity of examining the 
drafting history of the Exceptions Clause. 
2010] A Return to Form for the Exceptions Clause 1423 
and the pronoun “it,” now that its antecedent (“this jurisdiction”) had 
been deleted, stood helplessly alone. 
3. Clarification—and Obfuscation—of the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause 
 Had the delegates intended to effect a substantive change when 
tailoring the Original Jurisdiction Clause to the revised Extension 
Clause, someone at that time likely would have brought up the need to 
consider the complementary clause about appellate jurisdiction. But it 
was not until the following day, August 28, that the delegates noticed the 
anomaly and rewrote the second sentence to fix “it”: 
In [two types of] cases . . . , the supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction. In all the other cases . . . , it the Supreme 
Court shall be have appellate jurisdiction . . . , with such excep-
tions . . . as the Legislature shall make.196 
This time, Madison did record the editing, describing it as a means “to 
prevent uncertainty whether ‘it’ referred to the supreme Court, or to the 
Judicial power.”197 Of course, “it” had in fact referred to neither of those 
two precisely but rather to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Thus the 
substitution of “the Supreme Court” alone did not cure the problem; 
“shall be appellate” was changed to “shall have appellate jurisdiction.” 
One can scarcely imagine an indication clearer than Madison’s com-
ment that the editing was grammatical housekeeping, not intended to 
shift the focus of the sentence from the form of jurisdiction (which an 
exception could make original) to a grant of jurisdiction (which an ex-
ception could withdraw). Yet the comment has been overlooked by 
scholars. 
 The editing motion passed easily. But whereas no dissent had been 
recorded the day before to the clarification of the Original Jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                      
196 See 2 Records, supra note 1, at 434 (Aug. 28), 434 ( journal), 437–38 (Madison’s 
notes) (recording the passage of the motion resulting in the above edits). 
197 2 id. at 434 (Aug. 28), 437 (Madison’s notes). Soon after the previous day’s change 
to the Extension Clause, a motion had been made to amend the Appellate Jurisdiction 
Clause by removing the default position of appellate form. See infra notes 221–244 and 
accompanying text (discussing that motion). The motion, which was unsuccessful, used 
the phrase “the judicial power” in the place of “it,” apparently on the mistaken assumption 
that all references to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would now be turned into the judi-
cial power. See 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal) (recording a mo-
tion that “the judicial power shall be exercised in such manner as the Legislature shall 
direct”), 431 (Madison’s notes). 
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Clause, the Maryland delegation voted against this new change.198 
Leading that delegation was Luther Martin, who fought all perceived 
encroachments on states in general199 and on their courts in particu-
lar.200 Martin may have hoped that the “it” would morph into “the Judi-
cial Power”; that way, any inferior courts that were established would be 
largely deprived of original jurisdiction (absent legislative exceptions), 
leaving more cases to be tried in state courts. Instead, after the previous 
day’s deletion of the “assignment clause,” which would have permitted 
the legislature to assign jurisdiction to inferior courts “in the manner 
. . . which it shall think proper,”201 the Constitution remained silent 
about the issue of jurisdictional form in cases before those courts. That 
silence was unsurprising; the establishment of inferior courts was not 
guaranteed, and any attempt to resolve that issue might have risked up-
setting the delicate Madisonian compromise. In any event, the Mary-
landers were outvoted, and Martin would soon stalk out of the Conven-
tion,202 but the drafting problems caused by the revision of the 
Extension Clause’s subject from “jurisdiction of the supreme court” to 
“Judicial Power” seemed to be solved. 
a. A Minor Interpretive Problem Solved, a Major One Spawned 
 Alas, with these edits, an unforeseen problem with the paragraph 
about original and appellate jurisdiction had arisen. Though seemingly 
innocuous, the recasting of the two sentences shrouded their once ap-
parent purpose. After the edits, that purpose could apparently be ei-
ther to designate forms of jurisdiction (as had been clear before) or to 
grant jurisdiction. Because both instances of “shall be” had become 
“shall have,” people could later interpret the sentences as focusing on 
having jurisdiction rather than on the form in which the jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                      
198 2 Records, supra note 1, at 434 (Aug. 28), 434 ( journal), 436 (tabulation of 9–1 
vote), 437–38 (Madison’s notes). 
199 Joseph C. Morton, Shapers of the Great Debate at the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787, at 194–96 (2006). 
200 At the Maryland ratifying convention, Martin condemned the subsidiary role for 
state courts he saw in the Constitution. 3 Records, supra note 1, at app. A, CLVIII, 172 
(speech of Luther Martin, as printed in newspapers), 204 (protesting that cases deciding 
federal law would be “taken away from the courts of justice of the different States, and con-
fined to the courts of the general government”); 3 id. at 220 (complaining that “[t]hese [fed-
eral] courts, and these only, will have a right to decide upon the laws of the United States”). 
201 2 id. at 176 (Aug. 6) (setting out the clause), 186–87 (Madison’s notes); 2 id. at 422 
(Aug. 27), 425 ( journal) (noting the deletion of the clause), 431 (Madison’s notes). 
202 See Morton, supra note 199, at 196 (setting the date of Martin’s departure as Sep-
tember 4). 
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would be.203 And this is precisely what happened: the orthodox view 
holds that the exceptions power enables Congress to stop the Supreme 
Court from having jurisdiction in certain cases altogether. 
 Neither the adjustment by the full Convention nor James Wilson’s 
division of Edmund Randolph’s provision about jurisdictional form 
into two sentences alone fully accounts for the distortion of the dele-
gates’ vision. Absent Wilson’s division, congressional power under the 
orthodox view might actually have been even more sweeping: if an ex-
ception to “hav[ing] appellate Jurisdiction” would eliminate jurisdic-
tion, why would the outcome be any different for “hav[ing] original 
Jurisdiction”? But that view may well not have taken hold at all because 
it would have been easier to divine—from the contrasting references to 
original and appellate jurisdiction in a single (hypothetical) sentence— 
that the focus of the whole sentence, and thus of its clause about excep-
tions, was jurisdictional form. Conversely, without the changes by the 
full Convention, Wilson’s division on its own might not have caused 
much interpretive damage; the claims of Professors Amar and Clinton 
notwithstanding, exceptions to a mandate that jurisdiction “shall be 
appellate” would naturally yield non-appellate jurisdiction.204 
 The confluence of the tinkering by Wilson and by the Convention, 
however, allowed the orthodox view to flourish. Once each instance of 
“shall be” turned into “shall have” (thanks to the Convention), the pas-
sage appeared equally likely to be providing for the existence of jurisdic-
tion as for its form. And because the sentence with the exceptions power 
referred to only the “appellate” form (thanks to Wilson), the contrast 
with “original” was somewhat inconspicuous and thus the form-shifting 
interpretation less than obvious. The Exceptions Clause was vulnerable 
to being hijacked, which indeed it was in the years immediately follow-
ing the Convention.205 
                                                                                                                      
203 For example, Professors James Liebman and William Ryan acknowledge that as late 
as August 27, Congress “might have been permitted to make the supreme court’s pre-
sumptively appellate jurisdiction in the specified cases original.” Liebman & Ryan, supra 
note 54, at 756. But they do not adopt that interpretation of the final version. Id. at 756 
n.274, 774 (rejecting the view that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction may be ex-
panded and opining that Congress “largely controls” federal jurisdiction). 
204 See supra notes 150–175 and accompanying text (discussing scholars’ claims that the 
form-shifting power disappeared in Wilson’s draft). 
205 See infra notes 316–318 and accompanying text (summarizing how the clause suc-
cumbed to the conventional interpretation). 
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b. Second-Guessing the Delegates’ Syntax 
 One might protest that had the delegates of the full Convention 
meant to retain the Committee of Detail’s vision for the paragraph 
about Supreme Court jurisdiction, they would not have blurred its focus 
by scrapping the “shall be” construction of the two sentences for “shall 
have.” It is a truism that one can criticize the interpretation of any 
document on the ground that its drafters could have used language that 
more precisely expressed the interpreter’s understanding.206 Such criti-
cism proves nothing more than the imperfection of a text, which for 
Article III is hardly a radical proposition. Still, it is worth contemplating 
why the delegates so blithely switched from “shall be” to “shall have.” 
 Once the phrase “supreme court” was no longer in the Extension 
Clause, the form-of-jurisdiction sentences took on a corollary task: in 
addition to allocating cases between “original” and “appellate,” the 
delegates had to specify whose jurisdiction they were describing. Ap-
parently, the most natural way of doing that was to make the court the 
subject of each sentence. That was not a bad choice, stylistically; hiding 
the name of the court in a possessive (“the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion shall be”) or in the object of a prepositional phrase (“the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court shall be”) would not have addressed the new 
question as directly. Moreover, the delegates may well have thought that 
the verb phrase that flowed from that choice— “shall have” —would 
dispel any doubts about whether, in light of the new “Judicial Power” 
language, the Supreme Court would necessarily have “Jurisdiction” in 
all the listed cases. 
 Ironically, that verb phrase instead helped facilitate the ahistorical 
argument that the Court could be deprived of “hav[ing]” jurisdiction. 
In retrospect, the delegates tried to pack too much into the two sen-
tences. Perhaps instead they should have spread the ideas across three: 
In all the cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall 
have jurisdiction. In [two types of] cases . . . , that jurisdiction 
shall be original. In all the other Cases before mentioned, it 
shall be appellate, with such Exceptions . . . as the Legislature 
shall make. 
                                                                                                                      
206 See Amar, Reports, supra note 53, at 1656 (positing that such criticism could be made 
of every reading of Article III); Meltzer, supra note 54, at 1574 (“[F]ar too many constitu-
tional interpretations could be defeated by the claim that, with 20/20 hindsight, the fram-
ers could have expressed their support for a particular view more clearly.”). 
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But one can hardly fault the delegates for valuing lexical economy or 
for failing to foresee that people would interpret their provision per-
mitting Congress to expedite cases to the Supreme Court as instead 
stopping cases from ever getting there. The relatively limpid prose that 
emerged from the Committee of Detail had become, at the full Con-
vention, unintentionally ambiguous. And so it came to pass that the 
insertion of the phrase “Judicial Power” led to a putative legislative 
power to strip the judiciary. 
4. Jostling over Jurisdictional Form 
 On August 27, the day the subject of the Extension Clause turned 
into the “Judicial Power,” triggering a trickle of superficial edits to the 
Appellate and Original Jurisdiction Clauses, the delegates debated sev-
eral proposals that would have substantively altered the Committee of 
Detail’s plan for the distribution of jurisdictional form. Each was with-
drawn or defeated. Still, the proposals and their dispositions bolster the 
conclusion that the deliberations of the day concerned the form fed-
eral jurisdiction would take, not whether it would be legislatively re-
tractable. 
a. The Withdrawn Motion to Withhold Original Jurisdiction from Inferior 
Courts 
 In the middle of a discussion about the jurisdictional form of the 
newly added category of U.S.-party cases, a motion was made—and 
then promptly withdrawn—to amend the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause 
to withhold original jurisdiction from inferior federal courts: “In all the 
other cases beforementioned original jurisdiction shall be in the Courts 
of the several States but with appeal both as to Law and fact to the 
courts of the United States, with such exceptions and under such regu-
lations, as the Legislatures shall make.”207 Right after the withdrawal, 
another motion was made and passed, settling the paragraph about 
jurisdictional form in close to its final wording.208 Presumably, the dele-
gates had decided that it was unnecessary to specify the original forum 
for cases that did not start in the Supreme Court. 
 Though a withdrawn motion can reveal only so much, this one 
helps show that the focus of the delegates at that time was on resolving 
the form of federal courts’ jurisdiction. Moreover, the explicit contrast 
                                                                                                                      
207 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 424 ( journal). 
208 See id. 
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between the “original” and “appe[llate]” forms in the same sentence as 
the reference to “exceptions” evoked the single-sentence structure of 
Edmund Randolph’s draft for the Committee of Detail, before James 
Wilson’s split obscured the interplay among those three terms. The 
proposal’s “exceptions” presumably would have rerouted original juris-
diction from state to federal courts, allowing the Supreme Court (or 
perhaps inferior courts) to hear cases right away. So read, the motion 
was another example of the delegates’ conception of the exceptions 
power as a way of steering cases quickly to a federal forum. 
 One scholar, David Engdahl, has instead interpreted the with-
drawn motion as proposing to allow Congress to withhold federal juris-
diction.209 Though as a textual matter that reading may be plausible, 
the context of the motion suggests otherwise. The Madisonian com-
promise had not resolved whether inferior courts, if created, would 
hear cases originally or only on appeal from state courts. Randolph’s 
draft had described inferior courts’ jurisdiction as “original”; Wilson 
had made that provision indeterminate, removing the reference to ju-
risdictional form. The withdrawn motion rejected Randolph’s position 
outright, trying to confine inferior courts’ jurisdiction to appeals and 
thus preserve the trial function in most cases for state courts. As such, 
the motion was mildly provocative but hardly dramatic. Had the motion 
sought as well to empower Congress to bar cases that started in state 
courts from ever coming to the Supreme Court—as Engdahl inter-
preted it—it would have been quite audacious.210 A premise of the 
Madisonian compromise appeasing the delegates who favored inferior 
courts was that even without those courts, “the right of appeal to the 
supreme national tribunal” would be “sufficient to secure the national 
rights & uniformity of Judgmnts.”211 There is no reason to think that 
the motion sought to undo that right of appeal. 
b. The Failed Proposal to Distinguish U.S.-Party Cases 
 The debate about jurisdictional form for U.S.-party cases sheds 
further light. That category of cases entered the Extension Clause just 
                                                                                                                      
209 Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits, supra note 72, at 114. 
210 Engdahl—who does not follow the conventional view of the actual Exceptions 
Clause—acknowledges that under his reading, the motion was jarring. See id. at 114–15 (call-
ing putative power to eliminate federal jurisdiction the motion’s “most interesting feature”). 
211 1 Records, supra note 1, at 115 ( June 5), 124 (Madison’s notes) (relating the com-
ment of Rutledge, who advocated deleting inferior courts from the amended Virginia 
plan). 
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before the withdrawn motion discussed above.212 As to the question of 
form, the new category was first explicitly added to the Original Juris-
diction Clause.213 But soon after, the delegates agreed on a version of 
the paragraph about jurisdictional form that did not mention U.S.-
party cases, implicitly relegating them to the “other” cases and thus to 
the default of appellate form.214 A motion was then made to stake out a 
middle ground for U.S.-party cases by adding a third sentence to the 
paragraph: “But in cases in which the United States shall be a Party the 
jurisdiction shall be original or appellate as the Legislature may di-
rect.”215 The proposal would have left those cases without even a default 
position, effectively requiring Congress to resolve the issue one way or 
another before any such cases could be heard.216 
 The delegates took a step to avoid the risk of legislative inertia by 
striking from the proposal, by a 6–2 vote, the words “original or.”217 
Without those words, though, the proposal’s language was awkward at 
best. Most likely, it would have been taken to mean that jurisdiction in 
U.S.-party cases could be appellate only, without the possibility of a shift 
to original form (and with legislative “direct[ion]” perhaps necessary to 
trigger even the appellate form). The majority of the Convention re-
jected the amended proposal by a 5–3 vote, evidently deciding to estab-
lish the appellate form as a default, without foreclosing the legislature’s 
ability to authorize original jurisdiction.218 Thus, no special language 
about the jurisdictional form of U.S.-party cases was necessary; they 
would be treated the same as “all the other Cases.” 
 The grammatical structure of the original proposal and its appar-
ent attempt at reaching a compromise between opposing positions con-
firm that the issue on the floor of the Convention was not whether the 
                                                                                                                      
212 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 423 ( journal), 430 (Madison’s notes). 
213 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 424 ( journal) (inserting “the United States or” before “a 
State shall be a party”). 
214 The successful motion amended the sentences to read as follows: 
In cases of impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, this jurisdiction shall 
be original[.] In all the other cases before mentioned it shall be appellate 
both as to law and fact with such exceptions and under such regulations as 
the Legislature shall make[.] 
Id. 
215 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 424 ( journal). 
216 Cf. Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 84 (calling the proposal “ambiguous, super-
fluous, or both”). 
217 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 424 ( journal). 
218 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 424–25 ( journal). 
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Supreme Court would have jurisdiction in U.S.-party cases; that grant 
had presumably already been accomplished by the addition of those 
cases to the Extension Clause (which was still, though not for long, 
phrased in terms of the “jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” rather 
than the “Judicial Power”). Rather, the jockeying was about what form 
the jurisdiction would take and whether the delegates should make that 
decision initially or leave it completely open for Congress. 
 Yet Akhil Amar cites the defeat of this proposal as evidence that 
original jurisdiction cannot be expanded to any cases beyond those 
listed, in that “the Convention explicitly rejected [an] amendment[] to 
Article III . . . that would have permitted augmenting the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction.”219 With respect to the pre-amendment 
version of the proposal, that statement is true as far as it goes, but the 
delegates did not reject the idea that original jurisdiction could ever be 
augmented; such elasticity was entrenched in the paragraph in ques-
tion regardless of the fate of the proposed extra sentence about U.S.-
party cases. More to the point, the proposal’s failure signaled rejection 
of both the idea (in the pre-amendment version) of withholding a de-
fault jurisdictional form and the idea (in the amended version) of fore-
closing the legislature’s ability to grant original jurisdiction in U.S.-
party cases—the opposite of what Amar contends. The delegates no 
more denied Congress the power to augment original jurisdiction than, 
by voting down a proposal that “no act of the Legislature . . . regulating 
. . . commerce . . . shall be passed without the assent of 2/3rds of the 
Members of each House,”220 they denied Congress the power to regu-
late commerce. 
                                                                                                                      
219 Amar, supra note 76, at 467–68 & n.115. Amar insists that the difficulty of travel to 
the nation’s capital compelled the delegates to confine original jurisdiction—exercised in 
trials, with their attendant need for witnesses—to a small number of cases. Id. at 469–78. 
He acknowledges, though, that days of easier travel were anticipated; in his telling, that 
foresight contemplated an eventual reduction in parochialism and thus justified the rele-
gation of diversity jurisdiction to his putative “second tier” of disputes that could be taken 
away from federal courts. Id. at 477–78. Even if the geographic analysis helps account for 
the paucity of cases with constitutionally guaranteed original jurisdiction, so too can the 
delegates’ vision of a metaphorically shrinking nation help explain why they included a 
mechanism allowing future legislators to gauge when improved means of travel would 
warrant statutory additions. 
220 See 2 Records, supra note 1, at 445 (Aug. 29), 445–46 ( journal), 449–53 (Madison’s 
notes). 
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c. The Rejection of Open-Ended “Manner” 
 The wrangling about jurisdictional form soon continued, with the 
stakes not limited to U.S.-party cases. After the expansion of the subject 
of the Extension Clause to the “Judicial Power” came a motion to 
amend the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause221 to read, “In all the other 
cases before mentioned the judicial power shall be exercised in such 
manner as the Legislature shall direct.”222 
 The proposal evidently would have punted the question of form 
for cases without guaranteed original jurisdiction completely to Con-
gress, without a constitutional starting point.223 As apparent from the 
word “manner,” the focus was not whether the Supreme Court (or infe-
rior courts) could exercise the judicial power, but how. The phrase “all 
the other cases” (mirroring the existing language, which would survive) 
yoked the proposal to the preceding sentence fixing the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction as “original” in cases with state parties or affecting 
foreign sovereign agents.224 Regarding the “other” cases, “manner” was 
a shorthand for jurisdictional form: Congress would need to decide 
whether the judicial power was to be exercised originally or on appeal. 
As it turned out, the delegates rejected the proposal by a 6–2 vote, pre-
serving the existing default position of appellate form.225 
 Just before the “manner” motion was made, the operative provi-
sion of the Original Jurisdiction Clause had been changed—to con-
form to the reconfigured Extension Clause—from “this jurisdiction 
shall be original” to “[t]he supreme Court shall have original jurisdic-
tion.”226 As discussed above, that change (in conjunction with the paral-
                                                                                                                      
221 Some have expressed uncertainty about where the language was to appear. See, e.g., 
Holt, supra note 79, at 1509 n.329 (noting that it was to go in an “unspecified” location). 
Madison’s notes referred to the motion as one to “insert.” 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 
(Aug. 27), 431 (Madison’s notes). The journal of the Convention, however, referred to it 
as an “amendment,” which rings true, as the language could have logically functioned only 
as a replacement of the existing Appellate Jurisdiction Clause. 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 
( journal); see also Amar, supra note 76, at 468 n.115 (calling the proposal one to “alter” 
existing language). 
222 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal), 431 (Madison’s notes). 
223 But cf. Claus, Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 86, at 468–69 n.34 (discounting 
the potential impact of the motion by calling the proposal “ambiguous or superfluous or 
both”); accord Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 84. 
224 Nondiplomatic “Consuls” have been referred to, along with “Ambassadors” and 
“other public Ministers,” as “foreign sovereign agents.” Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct 
Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 830, 855, 884–85 (2006). 
225 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal). 
226 Id.; see supra notes 192–195 and accompanying text. 
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lel one in the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause227) would in future years 
mislead interpreters by highlighting the identity of the court at the ex-
pense of the form of jurisdiction.228 By using the word “manner” in the 
sentence to be linked with the Original Jurisdiction Clause, the rejected 
proposal signaled that even though that clause had been recast out of 
grammatical necessity, it was still understood as addressing the form in 
which jurisdiction would be exercised. 
 Several scholars have asserted that the proposal, as one put it, 
“would have given Congress complete control over the Court’s appel-
late jurisdiction,”229 and thus that its defeat shows that the exceptions 
power was not meant to be unfettered.230 For example, in support of 
his thesis that excepted cases must acquire jurisdiction in inferior 
courts, Robert Clinton has written of the “manner” motion’s fate that 
“[a] clearer rejection of congressional authority over judicial powers is 
hard to imagine.”231 Likewise, Leonard Ratner interpreted the defeat as 
an embrace of his view, namely, that exceptions must preserve the “es-
sential constitutional functions of the Court.”232 But the proposal had 
raised no specter of substantive legislative control; it addressed only the 
“manner” of “exercis[ing]” jurisdiction. 
 That narrow focus has also been overlooked by scholars who view 
congressional power as more boundless. For example, Julian Velasco 
                                                                                                                      
227 2 Records, supra note 1, at 434 (Aug. 28), 434 ( journal), 437–38 (Madison’s 
notes); see supra notes 196–205 and accompanying text. 
228 See supra notes 203–205 and accompanying text. 
229 Sager, supra note 65, at 49–50 n.95 (calling this reading “commonly understood” 
and speculating that the proposal might have even allowed Congress to increase the Su-
preme Court’s original jurisdiction); see also Ratner, supra note 68, at 944 (reading the 
proposal as asserting “unrestricted congressional control over the Supreme Court’s appel-
late jurisdiction”). 
230 See Brant, supra note 70, at 7 (opining that the rejected language “would have given 
Congress the extensive power it claims it possesses”); Levy, supra note 35, at 183 (positing that 
the rejected edit would have given “full control to Congress” over the Supreme Court’s juris-
diction); Mickenberg, supra note 70, at 515–16 (interpreting the motion’s defeat as a rejec-
tion of full congressional power over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); 
Strasser, supra note 70, at 175 & n.291 (interpreting the motion’s defeat as a rejection of “ple-
nary control over the jurisdiction of the Court”); cf. Goebel, supra note 72, at 243 n.228 (call-
ing the rejection of the motion evidence that “the majority wished to eliminate legislative 
direction and make the judicial [branch] a fully coordinate department”). 
231 Clinton, supra note 71, at 791 (acknowledging but largely discounting the possibil-
ity that the proposal’s focus was merely a distribution of jurisdictional form). Amar, who 
espouses in part (for his “mandatory” tier of cases) the same theory, also finds the failure 
of the proposal to be significant. Amar, Two Tiers, supra note 53, at 214 n.39 (interpreting 
the rejection as foreclosing the possibility of expanding the Supreme Court’s original ju-
risdiction); Amar, supra note 76, at 467–68 & n.115 (same). 
232 Ratner, supra note 65, at 173. 
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has characterized the proposal as merely “stylistic,” as Congress already 
had “plenary authority” over federal jurisdiction.233 If anything, in his 
view, the proposal would have fortified legislative control by “em-
power[ing] Congress to dictate to the courts how they should decide 
the cases before them.”234 Similarly, James Liebman and William Ryan 
interpret the rejection as having protected the “quality” or independ-
ence of adjudication guaranteed by Article III, in that the proposal 
would have allowed Congress to manipulate the way courts go about 
deciding cases.235 
 Those readings accord “manner” more weight than it can bear. At 
the time of the failed motion, the “assignment clause” (addressing infe-
rior courts’ jurisdiction) was still part of the draft of Article III (though 
it would not survive the day).236 The first draft of that clause had envi-
sioned inferior courts “as original tribunals,”237 but the version re-
ported by the Committee of Detail to the Convention dropped that 
prescription, instead permitting the legislature to bestow jurisdiction 
on them “in the manner . . . which it shall think proper.”238 The word 
“manner” evidently referred to whether inferior courts could hear cases 
originally or (as the failed motion discussed above had advocated239) 
only on appeal from state courts. Along similar lines, the earlier motion 
about U.S.-party cases had proposed that jurisdiction be “original or ap-
pellate as the Legislature may direct”;240 the broader motion about “all 
the other cases,” by proposing that the judicial power be “exercised in 
such manner as the Legislature shall direct,” conveyed the same idea in 
slightly different language.241 
 In the context of the debates about jurisdictional form, the import 
of the “manner” motion—which sought to amend a paragraph devoted 
to that very topic—was clear. “[I]n such manner” did not mean, as the 
scholars above theorized, “in such cases” or “with such results”; it meant 
                                                                                                                      
233 Velasco, supra note 48, at 732–33. 
234 Id. at 733; see also Rossum, supra note 48, at 393 n.44 (arguing that the existing lan-
guage lets Congress control which appellate cases the Supreme Court hears, whereas the 
proposal would have allowed it to determine the outcome of cases). 
235 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 54, at 754 & n.271. 
236 See 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal) (striking clause), 431 
(Madison’s notes). 
237 4 id. at 37 (Randolph draft), 48; see also 2 id. at 137 (Randolph draft), 147; supra 
note 131 (explaining the different transcriptions in volumes 2 and 4 of Records). 
238 2 Records, supra note 1, at 176 (Aug. 6), 177 (report of the committee) (Madison’s 
notes), 186–87. 
239 See supra notes 207–211 and accompanying text. 
240 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 424 ( journal) (emphasis added). 
241 Id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal) (emphasis added). 
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“in original or appellate form.”242 In the final Constitution, the word 
“manner” does not appear in Article III, but elsewhere, such as in the 
Article I provision about the “Times, Places and Manner” of congres-
sional elections, it refers to procedural matters.243 Reading that word in 
the motion as giving Congress substantive authority to deny jurisdiction 
overestimates its reach. The motion was simply one in a series hashing 
out the details of jurisdictional form. As the delegates tweaked the 
committee’s draft, on August 27 and beyond, not once was it suggested 
that Congress might control the existence, as opposed to merely the 
form, of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.244 
IV. The Appellate Jurisdiction Clause in Full Form 
A. The “Regulations” Power 
 The segment of the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause undergirding 
the orthodox view of congressional control is of course known most 
formally as the Exceptions and Regulations Clause. Though few have 
constructed arguments founded squarely on the premise that the Su-
preme Court has appellate jurisdiction “under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make,”245 defenders of the orthodoxy often stress the 
clause’s full name. But the contention that Congress may “regulate” 
                                                                                                                      
242 See supra notes 231–235 and accompanying text. 
243 U.S. Const. art. I, § 4; see also id. art. II, § 1 (giving state legislatures control over 
the “Manner” of selection of presidential electors); id. art. IV, § 1 (giving Congress the 
power to prescribe the “Manner” in which public acts of states can be proved). 
244 In the Committee of Detail, Randolph had floated such an idea for some cases, 
only to have it scotched by Wilson. See supra note 142 (referring to Randolph’s Extension 
Clause category for certain “other cases, as the national legislature may assign”). 
245 See Mickenberg, supra note 70, at 509 n.79 (“[T]he ‘regulations’ aspect of the ex-
ceptions clause generally has been ignored.”). One scholar has even renounced that po-
tential justification for the conventional wisdom. See Velasco, supra note 48, at 714–15 (de-
fending the traditional view but acknowledging that the term “regulations” does not 
bolster it). 
Most notably, one who did rely on the regulatory power was Chief Justice John Mar-
shall. In holding that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to review a criminal case 
from the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, he wrote that although the Constitu-
tion would permit such jurisdiction, the relevant statute, which referred only to civil cases, 
did not: “[A]s the jurisdiction of the court has been described, it has been regulated by 
congress, and an affirmative description of its powers must be understood as a regulation, 
under the constitution, prohibiting the exercise of other powers than those described.” 
United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 173 (1805); see also Liebman & Ryan, supra 
note 54, at 756, 777 (calling the “Regulations” power “the source of [Congress’s] ability to 
control appeals” by “declining to authorize the transfer of records and issuance of judg-
ments needed to permit appeals”). 
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appellate jurisdiction by withdrawing it from certain cases, without a 
shift to original form, is unpersuasive. The power to regulate may be 
hard to circumscribe with precision, but the constitutional text, con-
text, and drafting history reveal it to be toothless—dispelling the no-
tion that Congress might be able to regulate the Court’s appellate ju-
risdiction out of existence.246 
1. Text and Context 
 If an exception does not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction 
but merely reshapes it, a regulation could hardly effect such a dramatic 
result. Exceptions are the more potent modifier in that they signal a U-
turn. Through an exception, a grant can be negated, as in the provi-
sion for a presidential pardon power “except in Cases of Impeach-
ment,”247 or a negation can turn into a grant, as in the provision that 
“[n]o Person except a natural born Citizen . . . shall be eligible to the 
Office of the President.”248 Through an exception, a power can be 
channeled to a new time, as in the shifting of appellate jurisdiction into 
the expedited original form, or to a new place, as in the provision that 
“[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by 
Jury,” which in conjunction with another clause sends impeachment 
trials to the Senate.249 In contrast, regulations override nothing. They 
merely harness a power, streamlining it for efficient use.250 
 Having jurisdiction “under [congressional] Regulations” is thus 
still having jurisdiction. It is just that Congress may enact clerical con-
trols to guide cases to and through the Supreme Court’s docket. “Regu-
lations” are referred to several other times in the Constitution. In only 
one place does the context spell out what is meant. Article I provides 
that the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections shall be 
set by the states but that Congress may change those “Regulations.”251 
The regulation of appellate jurisdiction was presumably intended to be 
                                                                                                                      
246 See Mickenberg, supra note 70, at 510 (arguing that the power to regulate jurisdic-
tion “cannot include the ability to abolish [it]”); Ratner, supra note 65, at 171 n.66 (citing 
cases in support of the proposition that the power to regulate is not the power to elimi-
nate). 
247 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; see also id. art. I, § 4 (“Congress may . . . alter [state-
prescribed electoral] Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”). 
248 Id. art. II, § 1. 
249 Id. art. III, § 2; see also id. art. I, § 3 (granting the Senate “the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments”). 
250 See 2 Thomas Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language 
(4th ed. 1797) (defining “regulate” as “[t]o adjust by rule or method; to direct”). 
251 U.S. Const. art. I, § 4. 
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similar, allowing Congress to promulgate rules of convenience and effi-
ciency to control the movement of cases.252 For example, a requirement 
that all appeals or petitions to the Supreme Court be filed within thirty 
days of the judgment in another court would be such a regulation. An 
act stripping the Court of jurisdiction over certain cases—thus elevating 
legislative policy over the allocation of judicial power in the Constitu-
tion—would not.253 
 To extend the analogy from above, consider the following instruc-
tions: “At dinner, the kids shall have hot food. At other mealtimes, the 
kids shall have cold food, with such exceptions, and under such regula-
tions, as you shall make.”254 No reasonable babysitter or parent would 
deem the elimination of a non-dinner meal to be an appropriate “regu-
lation.” Procedural “housekeeping” rules,255 such as that one must wash 
hands before a meal and refrain from yelling during it, would be le-
gitimate. But a regulation cannot destroy what it is regulating. As with 
the original version of the hypothetical, context—the understood prin-
ciple that at mealtimes, children eat (paralleling the constitutional 
principle that in listed cases, the Supreme Court is vested with the judi-
cial power)—confirms the conclusion. Appeals may be dismissed for 
lateness, and children for loudness.256 Doing away with a case or meal 
ab initio, though, under the guise of “regulation,” would mangle the 
word beyond recognition. 
2. Drafting History 
 The drafting history of Article III likewise shows that “Regulations” 
were not intended to be paradoxically more potent than “Exceptions.” 
The regulatory power originated, as an organizational afterthought, in 
Edmund Randolph’s draft and was then incorporated,257 in more for-
                                                                                                                      
252 See Ratner, supra note 65, at 170 (citing several eighteenth-century dictionaries to 
the effect that “regulation” meant “rule imposed to establish good order”). In the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, the First Congress used a phrase that captured the non-substantive nature 
of regulations: “necessary rules for the orderly conducting [of] business.” Ch. 20, § 17, 1 
Stat. 73, 83 (delegating to the judiciary the authority to establish such rules). 
253 See Beck, supra note 66, at 780 (arguing that whereas Congress’s exceptions power 
permits it to “preclude the Court from entertaining [a] claim,” the regulations power 
“merely sets order or method to the process”). 
254 See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text (introducing analogy). 
255 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) (reaffirming Congress’s power to 
prescribe nonsubstantive “housekeeping rules for federal courts”). 
256 Compare Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206–07 (2007) (sending a case away after a 
missed deadline), with Maurice Sendak, Where the Wild Things Are (1963) (sending a 
child away after mischief). 
257 See infra notes 260–267 and accompanying text. 
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mal language, into James Wilson’s revision.258 The apparent indiffer-
ence of other delegates to the language, however, suggests that it was 
accorded little import at the Convention.259 
a. Edmund Randolph’s Afterthought 
 The “[r]egulat[ory]” power arose explicitly in James Wilson’s draft 
for the Committee of Detail but had its roots in a late addition to the 
preceding draft by Edmund Randolph: “[T]his supreme jurisdiction 
shall be appellate only, except in those instances, in which the legisla-
ture shall make it original. and the legislature shall organize it[.]”260 
Though some scholars have seized on the word “organize” as an early 
source of authority to take cases from the Supreme Court,261 to organ-
ize something is not to eliminate it. A request to organize some papers 
could hardly be obeyed by throwing them away, as quips about “the cir-
cular file” suggest. Elsewhere in his draft, Randolph listed a congres-
sional power to “organize the government” in some indeterminate in-
stances.262 What he had in mind, one suspects, was not that Congress 
might dismantle the government, but that it would enact regulatory 
measures to implement the constitutional plan.263 Similarly, there is no 
indication that Randolph thought Congress should be able to “organ-
ize” the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction by nullifying it. 
 The organizational directive was an afterthought. The text in 
Randolph’s hand shows that the spacing between the seventh and 
eighth subparts of the judiciary provision was consistent with that be-
                                                                                                                      
258 See infra notes 268–271 and accompanying text. 
259 See infra notes 272–279 and accompanying text. 
260 Meigs, supra note 102, at 316-VII (reprinting facsimile of Randolph’s handwritten 
draft) (emphasis added); 2 Records, supra note 1, at 137, 147; see also 4 id. at 37 (Randolph 
draft), 48 (substituting a colon for the first period); supra note 131 (explaining the different 
transcriptions in volumes 2 and 4 of Records). 
261 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 54, at 738 (claiming that the word “organize” in 
Randolph’s draft “expressly” empowered the legislature to restrict the Court’s jurisdiction). 
262 4 Records, supra note 1, at 37 (Randolph draft), 45 (in an incomplete sentence, re-
ferring to a legislative power to “organize the government in those things, which”); 2 id. at 
137 (Randolph draft), 144. The fragment was crossed out, presumably by either Randolph or 
John Rutledge. 
263 Madison had previously spoken of the importance that the new government be 
“organized” in republican form. 1 id. at 209 ( June 12), 219 (Madison’s notes). As David 
Engdahl has put it, Randolph’s clause would have “enabled the legislature to resolve any 
otherwise unresolved problems of judicial organization and work load allocation.” Eng-
dahl, What’s in a Name?, supra note 72, at 482 ( judging Randolph’s two clauses about or-
ganization to be precursors to the Necessary and Proper Clause); see also Clinton, supra 
note 71, at 774 (interpreting the organizational power to concern “rules of practice and 
procedure”). 
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tween other subparts, until he squeezed in between two lines, in smaller 
letters than usual, “and the legislature shall organize it.”264 Those words 
followed a period, showing that the idea had earlier been complete 
with “shall make it original.”265 One of the only other places where 
Randolph put a period in the judiciary provision was just before he 
likewise wedged the phrase “and [judges] shall swear fidelity to the un-
ion” in between two lines, in cramped script.266 That Randolph appar-
ently inserted the words about organization only after he had finished a 
preliminary draft of the provision suggests that they were collateral to 
the allocation of jurisdictional form. 
 Randolph’s draft contained no version of the eventual Necessary 
and Proper Clause,267 and he may have feared that without the added 
language, Congress might be unable to enact logistical measures gov-
erning the filing of cases in the Supreme Court. His directive to the 
legislature to “organize” the jurisdiction contemplated a clerical duty, 
not a license to eviscerate another branch of the government. 
b. James Wilson’s Restyling 
 James Wilson built on Randolph’s ideas but chose different lan-
guage for his draft. The phrasing of congressional power to make ex-
ceptions to the appellate form of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was 
revised,268 and in place of the mandate to “organize,” he wrote of “Regu-
lations”: “In all the other Cases beforementioned, [jurisdiction] shall be 
                                                                                                                      
264 Meigs, supra note 102, at 316-VII (reprinting facsimile of Randolph’s handwritten 
draft). 
265 See id.; 2 Records, supra note 1, at 137 (Randolph draft), 147; cf. 4 id. at 37 
(Randolph draft) (corrected version), 48 (rendering the punctuation mark as a colon 
rather than a period). Max Farrand’s version in volume 2 of Records is a transcription from 
a facsimile; his updated version in volume 4 uses different punctuation based on a review 
of the original. 2 id. at 137 n.6; 4 id. at 37 n.6. Presumably, some faint but visible marks on 
the original manuscript made what had in the facsimile seemed to be periods instead ap-
pear to be colons. That distinction occurs not only before “and the legislature shall organ-
ize it” but in several places throughout the judiciary provision. Compare 2 id. at 137 
(Randolph draft), 146–47 (using periods), with 4 id. at 37 (Randolph draft), 47–48 (using 
colons). In the updated version, colons end several of the subparts, so regardless of what 
the punctuation mark before “and the legislature shall organize it” actually was, that lan-
guage seems to have been a late addition. 
266 Meigs, supra note 102, at 316-VII (reprinting facsimile of Randolph’s handwritten 
draft); see also 4 Records, supra note 1, at 37 (Randolph draft) (corrected version), 47; 2 
id. at 137 (Randolph draft), 146. 
267 Wilson inserted the “necessary and proper” power in his later draft. 2 Records, su-
pra note 1, at 163 (Wilson draft), 168. 
268 See supra notes 150–161 and accompanying text (comparing Wilson’s draft to 
Randolph’s). 
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appellate, with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Legisla-
ture shall make.”269 
 Wilson was using another phrase, a bit more legalistic, to convey 
the same idea as Randolph’s (though with a diluted sense of legislative 
duty).270 In the very next clause of his draft, Wilson used a word giving 
Congress a substantive power to withhold jurisdiction: “Limitations.” 
Randolph had introduced the “assignment clause,” the provision em-
powering the legislature to assign the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to 
inferior courts; Wilson elaborated that such “distribut[ion]” would be 
“in the Manner and under the Limitations which [the legislature] shall 
think proper.”271 Had Wilson contemplated similar control over the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, he likely would have framed the legis-
lative power as one to limit, rather than to regulate. 
c. The Convention’s Indifference 
 The Committee of Detail was working from the resolutions ap-
proved by the Convention, none of which called for any control by 
Congress over whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction. Nor did 
the resolutions say anything about jurisdictional form, to be sure, but 
the topic had been tentatively raised,272 and although the Convention 
had not settled anything, it was natural for the committee to address 
that detail when fleshing out the skeletal structure of the amended Vir-
ginia plan. Likewise, enabling the legislature to organize or regulate 
jurisdiction through neutral procedural rules was hardly jarring. 
                                                                                                                      
269 2 Records, supra note 1, at 163 (Wilson draft), 173 (emphasis added). “[B]efore- 
mentioned” cases were those referred to in the Extension Clause but not in the Original 
Jurisdiction Clause. See id. 
270 See Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 82 (“The most plausible reading of Wilson’s 
provision for the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is that . . . Randolph’s ‘organize’ becomes 
Wilson’s ‘Regulations.’”). Indeed, Wilson himself used “regulation” and “organiz[ation]” 
as synonyms when discussing the judicial power at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. 
See 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Fed-
eral Constitution 486 (Dec. 7, 1787), 488 ( Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinaf-
ter Elliot’s Debates] (stating that because delegates to the Federal Convention had not 
had time to develop appropriate “regulations” concerning the conduct of civil trials, they 
had left the issue to be “organized” by Congress). As with citations of Farrand’s Records, in 
order to orient the reader, I have included in each citation of Elliot’s Debates the page num-
ber for the start of the day in question, followed by the page number for the specifically 
relevant material. See supra note 1. 
271 2 Records, supra note 1, at 163 (Wilson draft), 173. 
272 E.g., 1 id. at 209 ( June 12), 211 ( journal), 220 (Madison’s notes) (noting the pro-
posal that “the jurisdiction of the supreme Tribunal shall be to hear and determine in the 
dernier resort [various cases]”). 
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 Providing for the potential obliteration of the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction, in contrast, would have provoked dissension. Af-
ter the committee reported its draft, which left Wilson’s Appellate Ju-
risdiction Clause alone other than in capitalization,273 many aspects of 
it were debated by the Convention, but the language about regulations 
went unnoticed and untouched, aside from a substitution by the Com-
mittee of Style, at summer’s end, of “Congress” for “Legislature.”274 The 
delegates seemed to understand that regulations would merely facilitate 
the Court’s jurisdiction, not negate it. 
 Two of the proposals rejected by the Convention are further evi-
dence that the delegates found “regulations” to be of little import. One 
would have made the Appellate Jurisdiction (and Exceptions and Regu-
lations) Clause more flexible, without a default form: “In all the other 
cases before mentioned the judicial power shall be exercised in such 
manner as the Legislature shall direct.”275 As discussed above, the phrase 
“in such manner” was primarily a proxy for “in appellate or original 
form.”276 Because the phrase also evoked the usual meaning of “regula-
tions,” it is no surprise that the proposal omitted that word. 
 Had “regulations” been viewed as signaling a power greater than 
control over the manner in which jurisdiction would be exercised— 
such as a power to invalidate its exercise—the proposal’s omission of the 
word would have been dramatic. Delegates wishing to repudiate that 
putative power likely would have tried to do so directly by moving to 
strike the offending word, rather than by recasting the existing sentence 
to remove the default form of jurisdiction. Conversely, if defenders of 
the putative power had opposed the proposal for lacking language 
about “regulations,” someone might well have offered an amended mo-
tion. Instead, the modest proposal was simply rejected, presumably on 
the ground that the Constitution should retain the default appellate 
form, subject to change by the legislature. 
 A similar motion, defeated earlier on the same day, proposed that 
the Court’s jurisdiction in U.S.-party cases “shall be original or appellate 
as the Legislature may direct.”277 Whereas the other proposal at least 
                                                                                                                      
273 2 id. at 176 (Aug. 6), 186 (Madison’s notes) (report of the Committee of Detail) 
(also adding a space between “before” and “mentioned”). 
274 2 id. at 582 (Sept. 12), 590 (report of the Committee of Style), 601. Though the 
Committee of Detail’s report had put “regulations” in lowercase, Wilson’s capitalization 
was later reinstated. 2 id. at 651 (Constitution), 661. 
275 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal), 431 (Madison’s notes). 
276 See supra notes 221–244 and accompanying text. 
277 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 424–25 ( journal). 
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gave a nod to the general regulatory power with the word “manner,” the 
one about U.S.-party cases was only about jurisdictional form. The ab-
sence of any reference to “regulations” apparently did not spark any de-
bate; the motion was voted down without any recorded discussion. 
 The indifference of the delegates toward the “regulations” of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is reflected in the final Constitution. 
When Randolph wrote that the legislature “shall organize it,” the “it” 
was the Court’s jurisdiction—original and appellate.278 When Wilson 
turned organization into regulation, he simultaneously divided 
Randolph’s single sentence into two.279 The meaning of “Exceptions” 
remained clear enough, as discussed above. Despite Wilson’s probable 
intent, however, the regulations appeared to apply only to jurisdiction 
that would “be appellate.” An indiscriminate invoker of expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius might infer that the delegates, by leaving Wilson’s 
language about regulations alone, wanted to bar Congress from regu-
lating jurisdiction that would “be original.” More likely, the Necessary 
and Proper Clause—introduced in Wilson’s draft—took over the role 
of authorizing Congress to enact rules facilitating both types of jurisdic-
tion, leaving the “regulations” of the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause dis-
pensable. The presence or absence of the word thus was not an issue of 
concern to most delegates. 
3. The Limits of “Regulations” 
 Clear as it is that regulation may not constitutionally drift into ju-
risdiction-stripping, the boundary is hard to pinpoint. James Madison 
recognized a similar difficulty when successfully arguing that because 
“times places & manner . . . were words of great latitude,” federal su-
pervisory authority over congressional elections was necessary to pre-
vent abuses of discretion in which state legislatures would “mould their 
regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed.”280 A 
thirty-day filing deadline for all cases before the Supreme Court may be 
constitutional, but what about a sizeable amount-in-controversy floor 
for a single type of case?281 Such a regulation might be defended as a 
practical response to a flood of litigation or attacked as an attempt to 
withhold jurisdiction from disfavored cases. 
                                                                                                                      
278 See 2 id. at 137 (Randolph draft), 147; see also 4 id. at 37, 48; supra note 131 (explain-
ing the different transcriptions in volumes 2 and 4 of Records). 
279 2 Records, supra note 1, at 163 (Wilson draft), 173. 
280 2 id. at 227 (Aug. 9), 240–41 (Madison’s notes). 
281 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (providing that the amount in controversy in diver-
sity cases must exceed $75,000). 
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 Resolving that sort of question may depend on legislative purpose. 
One useful parallel is the First Amendment doctrine distinguishing be-
tween content-based speech restrictions and neutral time, place, and 
manner regulations largely by the reason for the government’s adop-
tion of the law in question.282 Another is the constitutional principle 
that a state generally may, through a “neutral state rule regarding the 
administration of the courts,” divest its courts of concurrent jurisdiction 
over cases that could be heard in federal court.283 In its 2009 decision 
in Haywood v. Drown, the Supreme Court explicated that concept in 
holding that a state may not single out actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against state corrections officers for an elimination of jurisdiction: 
[A] State cannot employ a jurisdictional rule “to dissociate [it-
self] from federal law because of disagreement with its con-
tent or a refusal to recognize the superior authority of its 
source.” In other words, although States retain substantial 
leeway to establish the contours of their judicial systems, they 
lack authority to nullify a federal right or cause of action they 
believe is inconsistent with their local policies.284 
 Regardless of whether one agrees with the outcome of Haywood (a 
5–4 decision), the Court’s language sets up an apt framework for differ-
entiating neutral regulations from arrogations of power. To wit, Con-
gress may not employ a jurisdictional statute to dissociate itself from 
constitutional law because of disagreement with the scope of federal 
jurisdiction. Although Congress retains leeway to establish the contours 
of how the judicial power will be triggered—such as through rules about 
timing or, perhaps, amount in controversy—it lacks authority to nullify 
federal jurisdiction that it believes is inconsistent with federal policy. 
 At some point, even a superficially neutral rule, such as a five-
million-dollar amount-in-controversy floor for all cases or a one-hour 
filing deadline, would violate Article III. A regulation that equally rav-
ages the nine categories of cases with federal jurisdiction is not saved by 
equality. That concept too was addressed by Haywood: “Although the ab-
sence of discrimination is necessary to our finding a state law neutral, it 
is not sufficient. A jurisdictional rule cannot be used as a device to un-
                                                                                                                      
282 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“The principal in-
quiry in determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”). 
283 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990). 
284 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2114 (2009) (quoting Howlett, 496 U.S. at 371) (internal citation 
omitted). 
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dermine federal law, no matter how evenhanded it may appear.”285 To 
complete the analogy, Congress cannot use “Regulations” to undermine 
federal jurisdiction, no matter how evenhanded they may appear. 
B. The Interposition of “Both as to Law and Fact” 
 The final substantive piece of the Appellate Jurisdiction (and Ex-
ceptions and Regulations) Clause was added late in the Convention. 
On August 27, in the midst of the discussion about which cases should 
be part of that jurisdiction,286 Pennsylvania’s Gouverneur Morris asked 
for clarification of “whether it extended to matters of fact as well as 
law.”287 After James Wilson responded on behalf of the Committee of 
Detail that he thought the answer was yes, Delaware’s John Dickinson 
moved to add “both as to law & fact” to the clause, interposing it be-
tween “it shall be appellate” and “with such exceptions and under such 
regulations as the Legislature shall make.”288 That motion was agreed to 
without dissent,289 and the delegates proceeded to consider the alloca-
tion of original and appellate jurisdiction.290 
 Despite its placement, one might contend that the new phrase was 
not meant to be subject to the power to make exceptions or regula-
tions; its role may have been merely to describe the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction parenthetically, and its proximity to the qualifiers 
mere happenstance.291 That interpretation, though conceivable, rests 
on an assumption that the delegates were politically tone-deaf. Later at 
the state ratifying conventions, speaker after speaker pilloried the in-
clusion of the word “Fact” in the proposed Constitution as trampling 
on the right to a jury trial.292 In Philadelphia, no delegates to the Fed-
                                                                                                                      
285 Id. at 2116. 
286 See 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 424 ( journal) (chronicling several 
motions about allocating original and appellate jurisdiction). 
287 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 431 (Madison’s notes). 
288 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 424 ( journal), 431 (Madison’s notes). The language had its 
roots in the New Jersey plan. See 1 id. at 241 ( June 15), 242 (Madison’s notes of New Jersey 
plan), 243 (proposing federal jurisdiction over errors “both in law & fact”). 
289 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 424 ( journal), 431 (Madison’s notes). 
290 2 id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 424–25 ( journal), 431 (Madison’s notes); see also supra notes 
212–244 and accompanying text (discussing two failed proposals about jurisdictional 
form). 
291 See Redish, supra note 50, at 914 (arguing that the commas setting off “Law and 
Fact” show that the exceptions apply to appellate jurisdiction, not to factual review). 
292 E.g., 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 270, at 505 ( June 18, 1788), 521 (speech by 
George Mason to the Virginia Convention), 524 (calling appellate jurisdiction as to fact 
“very dangerous”); 3 id. at 531 ( June 20, 1788), 539 (speech by Patrick Henry to the Vir-
ginia Convention), 540 (fulminating that appellate jurisdiction as to fact would “destroy 
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eral Convention had articulated that concern, perhaps because of an 
understanding that Dickinson’s language was added in front of the lan-
guage about exceptions and regulations for the express purpose of 
permitting Congress to rein in the Court’s appellate review of facts. 
That at any rate is the explanation Federalists seized on at the state 
conventions to quell the populist furor.293 
 That defense of Article III may or may not have been a post-hoc 
rationalization,294 but in any event, the uproar about whether the Su-
preme Court’s authority to review findings of fact was insuperable was 
soon addressed by the Seventh Amendment.295 Remaining open, 
though, were undebated questions of whether the insertion of “both as 
to Law and Fact” before “with such Exceptions” had either (1) severed 
the connection between the exceptions power and jurisdictional form 
or (2) crafted a legislative warrant to make exceptions to the Court’s 
capacity to review issues of law. 
 As to the first question, some scholars have argued that the only 
role of the Exceptions Clause is to allow exceptions with respect to the 
                                                                                                                      
the trial by jury”). Alexander Hamilton aptly summed up the outrage: “The propriety of 
this appellate jurisdiction has been scarcely called in question in regard to matters of law; 
but the clamors have been loud against it as applied to matters of fact.” The Federalist 
No. 81, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Charles Warren, 
New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 56 (1923) 
(noting the fervor at state ratifying conventions for an amendment to confine appellate 
jurisdiction “to questions of law, and not of fact”). 
293 At the Pennsylvania convention, James Wilson stressed that “proper regulations” 
would ensure the protection of the right to trial by jury. 2 Elliot’s Debates, supra note 
257, at 486 (Dec. 7, 1787), 488; see also The Federalist No. 81, at 490 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (italicizing both “fact” and “exceptions” in stressing the 
legislature’s ability to protect the right to trial by jury). Advocating for ratification at the 
Virginia Convention, Edmund Randolph acknowledged the furor by referring to appellate 
jurisdiction as an “evil,” but he found solace in the legislative power: “I hope . . . that Con-
gress will prohibit the appeal with respect to matters of fact.” 3 Elliot’s Debates, supra 
note 270, at 194 ( June 10, 1788), 205 (adding that “no danger” could arise from appellate 
jurisdiction as to law); see 3 id. at 562 ( June 21, 1788), 576 (“The appellate jurisdiction 
might be corrected, as to matters of fact, by the exceptions and regulations of Congress 
. . . .”). Others in Virginia voiced similar points. E.g., 3 id. at 531 ( June 20, 1788) ( James 
Madison), 534 (“[I]f gentlemen should contend that appeals, as to fact, can be extended 
to jury cases, I contend that, by the word regulations, it is in the power of Congress to pre-
vent it . . . .”); 3 id. at 505 ( June 18, 1788), 519 (Edmund Pendleton) (wishing that the 
words “both as to law and fact” had been “buried in oblivion” but citing the Exceptions 
and Regulations Clause as the basis for assuaging concern about appellate review of facts). 
294 See Claus, One Court, supra note 86, at 92 (calling Federalists’ claims “not true”). 
295 Cf. id. at 117–18 (finding support for congressional restriction of the Court’s review 
of facts not in Article III but in the Seventh Amendment, which “capture[d] the ratifying 
generation’s desired limitation on appellate review of factual issues”). 
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review of facts.296 For example, relying on statements by Wilson and 
Alexander Hamilton during the ratification process (in response to 
charges of usurpation of the right to trial by jury) and a proposed revi-
sion of Article III found among the papers of George Mason (as well as 
the above exchange between Morris and Wilson), Irving Brant claimed 
“conclusive” proof that the clause’s “sole purpose . . . was to permit 
Congress to limit appellate jurisdiction over questions of fact in cases at 
law.”297 Even if such exceptions are permitted, the “sole” has no basis. 
Neither the Mason document298 nor the statements cited by Brant in-
timate such exclusivity.299 
 Moreover, though the text of the Exceptions Clause may admit of 
such a reading (among others), its history does not. The link between 
exceptions and jurisdictional form was established (with nary a hint that 
exceptions could, let alone must, be about factual review) long before 
the phrase “both as to law & fact” intruded,300 and nothing surrounding 
that August 27 edit suggests that any delegate wanted to rupture that 
link.301 The discussion about facts on that day served to circumscribe the 
                                                                                                                      
296 See supra note 70 (listing such scholars). 
297 Brant, supra note 70, at 11. 
298 The Mason document proposed limited review of facts: “In all other Cases before 
mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction as to matters of law only—
except in cases of equity, and of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction in which the Supreme 
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and 
other regulations as the Congress may make.” Id. at 10 (quoting Ratification of the Constitu-
tion by the Several States, in Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of 
the American States 1031–34 (C. Tansill ed. 1927)); see also 4 Records, supra note 1, at 
53 (Aug. 27), 54 & n.17, 55 (reprinting earlier version of same document without Excep-
tions Clause and noting lack of evidence of its presentation at Convention). Evidently, the 
point of the proposed revision was to narrow the scope of factual review, but it can still be 
read as providing for exceptions to the appellate form of jurisdiction. 
299 At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, Wilson defended the Constitution’s inclu-
sion of the word “Fact” on the ground that experience had shown appellate authority to 
overturn jury verdicts to be important in admiralty cases about capture. He added that 
other such cases would arise and stressed that Congress would be in a better position than 
the delegates in Philadelphia had been to decide what those cases would be. Thus, he sug-
gested that Congress could control the cases in which the Supreme Court would be able to 
review facts, but in no way did he foreclose other functions of the Exceptions Clause. 2 
Elliot’s Debates, supra note 270, at 486 (Dec. 7, 1787), 493–94, quoted in Brant, supra 
note 70, at 7–8. Similarly, Hamilton cited the clause as enabling Congress to calibrate pre-
cisely when the Court could review facts. The Federalist No. 81, at 488–90 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), quoted in Brant, supra note 70, at 8–9. Just as Wil-
son did not limit the clause to that role, though, nor did Hamilton. 
300 See Clinton, supra note 71, at 778–79, 790–91 (stressing that the Exceptions Clause 
arose before the “Law and Fact” addition). 
301 Brant asserted, with no basis, that the purpose of the Exceptions Clause had all 
along been narrower than its original wording suggested; in his view, the August 27 ex-
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decisional breadth, not the procedural timing, of Supreme Court review. 
Brant professed to be “staggered” by the prospect of the Court’s emascu-
lation under the wide-ranging congressional power that is widely as-
sumed.302 His reaction was understandable. The uplifting truth, however, 
is not that exceptions apply only to the review of “Fact[s],” but rather 
that exceptions to “appellate Jurisdiction” merely change its form. 
 As to the second question, if exceptions can operate on the word 
“Fact,” then one might argue that jurisdiction as to “Law” too is vulner-
able. On its face, Dickinson’s added phrase could be read as enabling 
Congress to except legal questions, confining the Supreme Court’s re-
view to factual issues. That interpretation, though, is belied by not only 
common legal sense but also the phrase’s origin. The clarification 
sought by Morris was not whether the scope of jurisdiction included 
questions of law; it was whether it included findings of fact.303 That 
much was evident in his (or at least Madison’s as a reporter) choice of 
conjunction in asking “whether it extended to matters of fact as well as 
law.”304 In that locution, the word following “as well as” is a given; the 
new, highlighted information precedes it.305 The point of the clarifying 
                                                                                                                      
change between Morris and Wilson finally conformed the language with that purpose. 
Brant, supra note 70, at 7. 
302 Id. at 28. 
303 Whereas it is not surprising that one conception of the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction would have largely limited it to questions of “Law,” with some exceptions for 
“Law and Fact,” 4 Records, supra note 1, at 53 (Aug. 27), 54 (document found among the 
papers of George Mason but not presented to the Convention), 54 n.17, 55; see supra note 
298 (quoting the full provision), one could not imagine a converse plan in which the 
Court’s review would have been limited to issues of fact. 
304 2 Records, supra note 1, at 422 (Aug. 27), 431 (Madison’s notes) (emphasis 
added). Morris also asked whether jurisdiction would extend to “cases of Common law as 
well as Civil law” and was told by Wilson that it would. Id. That colloquy has been cited as 
support for the theory that the Exceptions Clause allows broad restrictions in general but 
prevents Congress from eliminating jurisdiction over constitutional cases, on the ground 
that constitutional law was a separate third category beyond the clause’s reach. Beck, supra 
note 66, at 793–95, 806–07. But Morris’s inquiry was about the scope of jurisdiction, not of 
the exceptions power. So the conclusion that constitutional cases were protected is correct 
but incomplete: all types of cases were. 
305 Practical English Usage: As Well As, Perfectyourenglish.com, http://www.perfectyour 
 english.com/archives/as-well-as.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2010); see also Fowler’s Modern 
English Usage 836–37 (R.W. Burchfield ed., rev. 3d ed. 1998) (calling “as well as” a syno-
nym for “in addition to”); cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206 (1977) (framing the in-
quiry about the scope of the recently established standard for in personam cases as “whether 
the standard . . . should be held to govern actions in rem as well as in personam”). The phrase 
“as well as” is the converse of “not only . . . but also,” in which the commonly accepted point 
comes first. See Fowler’s Modern English Usage, supra, at 836 (noting the historical paral-
lel of the two constructions); 12 Oxford English Dictionary W285 (1933) (noting that “as 
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language— “both as to Law and Fact” —was thus that the Court’s juris-
diction would reach issues not only of law, as everyone knew it would, 
but also of fact. In sum, if the late addition to the Appellate Jurisdiction 
Clause gave Congress any suppressive power at all, it was to restrict the 
Court’s review of “Fact[s].” Questions of “Law” remained immune. 
Conclusion 
 James Madison’s quixotic proposal of a judicial veto need not be 
resurrected to stop legislative invasion of the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion. All that is necessary is a return of the Exceptions Clause to its fo-
cus on jurisdictional form. 
 Despite challenging centuries of conventional wisdom, the reform 
proposed in this Article does not depend on the notion of a “living” 
Constitution that evolves in concert with the society governed by it;306 
my dissidence springs from the wisdom of the Convention that begat 
the document. Nor, however, do I owe a debt to “originalism” in the 
usual sense. Instead, this reading of Article III seeks simply to restore its 
syntactic integrity.307 
 The modish doctrine of originalism, with strains based on intent, 
meaning, and understanding,308 is a post-Warren Court vehicle for at-
tacking evolutionary interpretations.309 Self-styled originalists insist that 
if a constitutional principle would have been applied in a certain way in 
                                                                                                                      
well as” conveys “weakened force” of what follows it and that in early usage the phrase ap-
proximated “not only . . . but also” with the contrasted words transposed). 
306 Cf., e.g., Michael L. Wells & Edward J. Larson, Original Intent and Article III, 70 Tul. 
L. Rev. 75, 78, 108, 119 (1995) (suggesting that political circumstances giving rise to Arti-
cle III militate against finding “enduring constitutional principles” in its terms and posit-
ing that “modern ethical and policy considerations” are the appropriate guide). 
307 My focus on syntactic integrity is similar in approach to what Ronald Dworkin has 
called “‘semantic’ originalism.” Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter 
of Interpretation 115, 119 (1997) (distinguishing that interpretive theory from “‘expec-
tation’ originalism,” which posits that principles “should be understood to have the conse-
quences that those who made them expected them to have”); see also Michael J. Perry, The 
Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 Va. L. Rev. 669, 681–82 
(1991) (distinguishing “sophisticated originalism” from its “unsophisticated” counterpart 
in which ratifiers’ opinions about applications of principles are treated as part of those 
principles). 
308 See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239, 244 
(2009) (referring to originalism as “a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that 
share little in common except a misleading reliance on a single label”); Tara Smith, 
Originalism’s Misplaced Fidelity: “Original” Meaning Is Not Objective, 26 Const. Comment. 1, 
2–6 (2009) (sketching “three schools of originalism”). 
309 Colby & Smith, supra note 308, at 247–48, 262–63 (tracing the development of 
modern originalism). 
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the eighteenth century, so must it be today.310 One may reasonably 
question whether such secondary levels of meaning, not explicitly en-
shrined in the Constitution, should bind or even guide modern inter-
preters.311 
 But that debate is irrelevant here. Unless one indulges in atextual 
hermeneutics, crucial to any interpretation is the semantic and syntac-
tic integrity of the language at issue.312 Deciphering which earlier part 
of the text “Exceptions” operate on is no less essential to an under-
standing of what Congress may do than is defining unfamiliar words 
and phrases in a provision such as the one later in Article III warning 
that “no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or For-
feiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.”313 
 Resolving such fundamental issues of syntax and semantics is akin 
to ensuring that letter combinations are read as the correct words. 
Usually, of course, bridging the communication gap between word and 
idea is trivial; nobody would transpose the letters in “Senator” to be 
read as “treason.” But what if the letters are not fully legible? The Sep-
tember 17 Constitution on handwritten parchment contains a smudge 
or slip of the pen in the sentence about how “[t]he Senate shall ch*se 
their . . . Officers.”314 Regardless of approach, no interpreters would 
disregard the unknown letter. If it turned out to be an “a,” originalists 
would either proclaim a chasing mandate or invoke the doctrine of 
“scrivener’s error”;315 “living Constitution” theorists, if they did not 
dismiss the provision as a “dead letter,” might announce that it had 
evolved into a senatorial choice. (In fact, the letter appears to be an ill-
formed “u.”) 
 Interpretive questions about the permissible extent of legislative 
“Exceptions” to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction (may excep-
tions outweigh what remains? may they undermine the Court’s essential 
                                                                                                                      
310 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 307, at 45–46, 145–46 (insisting that because the death 
penalty was accepted at the time of the Bill of Rights, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
of “cruel and unusual punishments” cannot, to an “originalist,” be held to bar it today); id. 
at 147, 149 (embracing the “‘time-dated’ meaning” of broad constitutional principles). 
311 See Dworkin, supra note 307, at 119–21 (critiquing “‘expectation’ originalism”). 
312 See id. at 117 (“Any reader of anything must attend to semantic intention . . . .”). 
313 As it happens, the provision about corruption of blood raises a syntactical issue as 
well: is its own “except[ions]” clause limited to forfeiture, or does it extend to corruption 
of blood? 
314 U.S. Const., art. I, § 3. An image of the handwritten September 17 Constitution is avail-
able at http://www.theindianreporter.com/historical_documents/constitution_of_united_ 
states.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
315 See Scalia, supra note 307, at 20–21 (claiming a license to rewrite text in “extreme 
cases,” when the drafter “obviously” erred). 
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functions?) are secondary to that of what is being excepted (jurisdic-
tion? its appellate nature?). That primary question depends not on 
whether words and phrases should retain connotative baggage they 
once had. Instead, it raises the core inquiry of semiotics: at the most 
basic level, what idea do the symbols represent? 
 If my account of the consistent syntactic role of the Exceptions 
Clause is correct, then the conventional view, treating “Exceptions” to 
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction as confiscatory rather than 
transformative, misapprehends the text not in a subtle way subject to 
debate about how to apply broad constitutional principles, but more 
fundamentally, like reading “ch*se” as “chase.” Originalism does not 
tolerate such historical sloppiness. Nor does living constitutionalism; 
the evolution is supposed to be by adaptation, not mutation. 
 Yet the confiscatory interpretation is nearly universal, perhaps be-
cause it was soon after the delegates left the Philadelphia Convention 
that a distorted view began to take hold. Some seeds were sown in the 
politicking of the ratification process, when Federalists defended the 
Constitution against the charge of trampling on jury rights by empha-
sizing Congress’s power to prevent the Supreme Court from reviewing 
findings of fact.316 Little was said then about any putative power to 
withdraw certain cases from the Court’s jurisdiction altogether. But in 
crafting the Judiciary Act of 1789, the First Congress implicitly assumed 
that power. Interpreting that statute in cases such as Marbury v. Madi-
son,317 the Supreme Court more or less explicitly embraced the concep-
tion of jurisdiction-stripping power that today is all but axiomatic.318 
 Accepting that power as a premise, scholars have explored its con-
tours, with one calling the question of how far Congress can go in using 
the Exceptions Clause to restrict the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction “one 
of the most difficult in the law of the federal courts.”319 When “Excep-
tions” are understood, however, as applying not to “Jurisdiction” or 
                                                                                                                      
316 See supra note 293 and accompanying text (summarizing Federalists’ responses to 
concerns about protection of the right to trial by jury). 
317 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174–75 (1803) (holding that Congress could not expand the 
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction). 
318 Because the misconception of the Exceptions Clause arose, albeit faintly, during 
the ratification process, an originalist relying on the understanding of the voters rather 
than the meaning of the text or the intent of the drafters might muster some slim argu-
ments for the conventional view. It was not until after ratification, however, that the confis-
catory interpretation began to flourish. A thorough etiology of the distortion of the clause 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
319 Mark Tushnet, “The King of France with Forty Thousand Men”: Felker v. Turpin and the 
Supreme Court’s Deliberative Processes, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 163, 164. 
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“supreme” but rather to “appellate,” the clause becomes far less cryptic. 
The need perceived by some to preserve “essential functions,” such as a 
forum for constitutional cases, whether in the Supreme Court or in an 
inferior court,320 is rendered moot. Of course, the term “Exceptions” 
itself is indeterminate; it may or may not be proper for Congress to al-
low the Supreme Court to hear all cases originally. Any vagueness, 
though, is relatively inconsequential, in that interpretive “errors” would 
not negate, but simply delay or hasten, the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion. 
 To be sure, the Exceptions Clause is not the only potential source 
of the power Congress is widely presumed to have over the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction. In an effort to harmonize the conventional view of 
the Exceptions Clause with the rest of Article III, many scholars have 
read the Extension Clause, with its list of cases to which “[t]he judicial 
Power shall extend,” not as a direct grant of jurisdiction to federal 
courts but merely as an authorization for Congress to confer jurisdic-
tion at its discretion.321 Under that reading, one could argue that even 
the transformative interpretation of the Exceptions Clause would not 
protect the Court’s jurisdiction; the paragraph about appellate and 
original forms might implicitly apply only to cases over which Congress 
has deigned to extend jurisdiction in the first place.322 Though a full 
discussion of that view of the Extension Clause is beyond the scope of 
this Article, it is unpersuasive. 
 In any event, the central justification for the “inva[sion]” of juris-
diction feared by Nathaniel Gorham and his fellow delegates to the 
Federal Convention323 has been that the Exceptions Clause expressly 
permits it. As I hope to have shown, that justification is groundless. The 
text and drafting history together show that the Exceptions Clause 
agreed to in Philadelphia was to affect not the existence of the Su-
preme Court’s jurisdiction but rather its form. The clause was designed 
to expedite cases, not to eliminate them. Although the exceptions 
power belongs to Congress, its beneficiary should thus be the Court. 
                                                                                                                      
320 See supra notes 59–77 and accompanying text (outlining academic perspectives). 
321 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
322 Cf. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 54, at 755 (speculating that the Original Jurisdic-
tion Clause “might leave the legislature with the power to decide whether to confer su-
preme court jurisdiction over those disputes”). 
323 See supra notes 5–13 and accompanying text. 
